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The Shin Beth Affair: National Security
Versus The Rule of Law in the
State of Israel
PAUL F. OCCHIOGROSSO*
"Did you take them captive with your sword
and bow that you would strike them down?"
II Kings 6:22
I. INTRODUCTION'
On the evening of April 12, 1984, four eighteen-year-old Pales-
tinians from the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip boarded a commuter bus
headed south from Tel Aviv toward the coastal city of Ashkelon.
About thirty-five Israelis were aboard. Shortly after boarding, the
Arabs pulled knives and grenades and ordered the driver to continue
past his destination and toward the Gaza Strip, saying they intended
to take the bus from Gaza across the border into Egypt and from
there negotiate the release of 500 Palestinians held in Israeli prisons.
The plan did not succeed. The passengers convinced the hijack-
ers to let a pregnant woman off the bus; she then flagged down a truck
and reported the hijacking. The Army and police set up roadblocks
along the highway as the terrorists forced the driver to continue south
toward, and then into, the Gaza Strip. Soldiers fired at the tires, even-
* B.A. (1982), M.A., Hebrew Literature (expected 1989), New York University; J.D.,
Columbia University (1988). Associate, KRAMER, LEVIN, NESSEN, KAMIN & FRANKEL,
New York.
Under the auspices of the Columbia Human Rights Internship program, the author
worked during the summer of 1986 for Amnon Zichroni, an Israeli civil rights attorney and
one of the petitioners in the case that is the main subject of this article.
All translations of Hebrew materials are those of the author, unless otherwise indicated.
1. The first part of the following account, through the text accompanying note 8, is
based on D. SHIPLER, ARAB AND JEw 86-90 (1986). Mr. Shipler was the New York Times
Bureau Chief in Jerusalem from 1979 to 1984 and covered the events described herein for that
newspaper. For a comprehensive account, in Hebrew, of the various military, political, and
legal events leading up to the Israeli Supreme Court decision that is the main subject of this
article, see Maariv (Israeli daily newspaper), Special Supplement on the "Shin Beth Affair,"
July 18, 1986 [hereinafter Special Supplement]. The Maariv supplement was also relied upon
in part for the factual background.
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tually blowing them out, and the bus came to a stop at the side of the
road, just north of the refugee center of Dir al-Balah.
Throughout the night, Army commandos prepared to assault the
bus, while officers pretended to negotiate with the terrorists. At dawn
the troops attacked, rescuing all of the hostages except one, a woman
who was struck by the soldiers' gunfire and killed. Initial news re-
ports, heavily censored, carried the Army's statement that all four
hijackers were killed-two immediately and two who were mortally
wounded in the assault and who then died on their way to the
hospital.
Such was not the case. In fact, two of the terrorists had been
captured alive and led away for interrogation. Exactly which security
force had custody of them is not clear. There were reports that both
the Border Police and the Shin Beth,2 Israel's secret police responsible
for internal security and the fight against terrorism, were involved.
The Israeli security forces beat the two Palestinians to death; both
died with fractured skulls.
When this information eventually became public, 3 a commission
of inquiry was established to investigate the allegations.4 The cause of
death was determined, and the case was referred to the Attorney Gen-
2. Shin Beth, as the secret police are often referred to in English, are two Hebrew letters
that stand for the organization's full title, Sherut HaBitabon HaKlali, which means the Gen-
eral Security Service. (Although usually spelled "Beth" in English, the second part of the
name is pronounced "bet.") The organization will be referred to in this article as the Shin
Beth. It is responsible for domestic security concerns, specifically terrorism, and is roughly
equivalent to the American F.B.I. It is to be distinguished from the organization known as the
Mossad, which is roughly equivalent to the American C.I.A., and which is responsible for
Israeli security concerns abroad.
3. The details of the two terrorists' deaths were not immediately made public. In fact,
the Army's original version, that the two terrorists who were not killed in the initial assault
died on their way to the hospital, might not have ever been refuted had it not been for pictures
taken by newspaper photographers on the scene. The photographs showed the two captured
terrorists being led away alive. These photographs were not made public for several days.
Reporters from the newspaper Hadashot took the photographs to the Palestinians' home vil-
lage in the Gaza Strip, where relatives and neighbors identified the two men. The information
and photographs were provided to David Shipler, who wrote several stories for the New York
Times. See, e.g., Hijacker's Death: Question in Israel, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1984, at A4, col. 3;
Death of a Hijacker: Stirrings in Israel, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1984, at A3, col. 1. See also D.
SHIPLER, supra note 1, at 88-89.
4. The Commissions of Inquiry Law, 23 Laws of the State of Israel 32 (1968) [hereinaf-
ter L.S.I.] (authorized translation from the Hebrew, prepared by the Ministry of Justice), pro-
vides, inter alia: "When it appears to the Government that a matter exists which is at the time
of vital public importance and requires clarification, it may decide to set up a commission of
inquiry which shall inquire into the matter and shall make a report to it." Id. § 1. See gener-
ally Elman, The Commissions ofInquiry Law, 1968, 6 ISRAEL L. REV. 398 (1971).
The Shin Beth Affair
eral's office for possible prosecution. More than a year later, in the
summer of 1985, Attorney General Yitzhak Zamir called for the pros-
ecution of twelve officials,5 various security personnel who were on
the scene at the time of the killings. But prosecution was slow in
coming, and sixteen months after the murders, General Yitzhak
Mordechai, who had admitted to pistol-whipping the hijackers-to
discover quickly, he claimed, whether they had left explosives on the
bus-was acquitted. 6 Charges against the other eleven security men
were dropped. As David Shipler, the New York Times correspondent
who covered the story, writes, "The two hijackers were dead, but no-
body was guilty of killing them."'7
In the spring of 1986 the issue was revived. The deputy chief of
the Shin Beth and two other officials went to Prime Minister Shimon
Peres and accused Avraham Shalom, the head of the Shin Beth, of
ordering the murders of the two Palestinian prisoners and then coor-
dinating agents' testimony so as to place the blame on General
Mordechai. It appeared that General Mordechai and his troops had
beaten the hijackers, but had turned them over to Shalom and his
Shin Beth agents, who then clubbed the Palestinians to death. Prime
Minister Peres did not act on this information. Attorney General
Zamir called for a police investigation, but this was opposed by Peres
as well as Vice-Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir,
who had been Prime Minister at the time of the hijacking and thus in
direct charge of the Shin Beth. The spreading scandal threatened to
topple the National Unity Government coalition of which Peres's La-
bor Party and Shamir's Likud Party were the main partners.
Attorney General Zamir resigned in protest, and the newly-ap-
pointed Attorney General, Yosef Harish, widely seen as a puppet of
the government,8 took up consideration of the issue. Harish deter-
5. The twelve officials were Brigadier General Yitzhak Mordechai, chief infantry and
paratroop officer, who had allegedly struck the prisoners with a pistol; five Shin Beth agents;
three soldiers; and three police officers, all of whom were among a larger group that had beaten
and kicked the hijackers after their capture. D. SHIPLER, supra note 1, at 89-90.
6. See Friedman, Israel Clears a General in 2 Arab Deaths, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1985,
at A3, col. 4.
7. D. SHIPLER, supra note 1, at 90.
8. The Verdict on Shamir, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1986, at A2, col. 3. The newspaper
Haaretz quoted "a senior jurist" as saying that "the Government took advantage of the fact
that at the head of the prosecutor's office stands a new attorney general who has not yet
studied all the directives of his predecessor." Elon, Ram Caspi and Yaakov Ne'emam Con-
vinced Herzog to Grant the Pardon to the Head of the Shin Beth, Haaretz (Israeli daily newspa-
per, Hebrew), June 26, 1986, at 1, col. 4.
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mined that the police investigation could not be stopped. 9
On June 25, 1986, President Haim Herzog, after consultation
with various members of the Government, granted full, unconditional
pardons to the head of the Shin Beth, Avraham Shalom, and three of
his senior aides.' 0 The pardons covered the events of the night of the
hijacking as well as all subsequent events up to the signing of the let-
ters of pardon. The move was widely seen in the press as a "deal"
worked out by the Government as a way to avoid an investigation
that would almost certainly implicate its top officials.I' Once the par-
dons had been granted, Attorney General Harish announced: "Now
that the President, by virtue of his authority, has granted a full par-
don to the head of the Shin Beth before the police opened any investi-
gation, it appears that there is no longer any reason for an
investigation."' 2
The President, the national "head of state" in Israel's parliamen-
tary form of government, in which real political power resides in the
Prime Minister and the Government itself, had acted under apparent
authority of Basic Law: The President of the State,' 3 which grants
him the "power to pardon offenders and to lighten penalties by the
reduction or commutation thereof.' 14 The pardons immediately set
off a wave of criticism and protest in the press and in legal circles.
The newspapers carried statements the next day by noted legal schol-
ars, questioning the authority of the President to pardon prior to con-
viction and even investigation and indictment.'5
Several private attorneys filed petitions with the Supreme
Court,' 6 challenging the validity of the pardons, claiming that the
President had exceeded his authority. The petitions also asked the
Court to order the police to open an investigation, claiming that it
was under statutory obligation to do so.' 7
9. Elon, supra note 8.
10. Id. For a detailed discussion of the political maneuverings leading up to the granting
of the pardons, see Maariv, Special Supplement, July 18, 1986, at 20-27.
11. See Maariv, Special Supplement, July 18, 1986, at 20-27.
12. Elon, supra note 8.
13. Basic Law: The President of the State, 18 L.S.I. 111 (1964) [hereinafter Basic Law:
President].
14. Id. at 112, § Il(b).
15. See, e.g., Bracha, Great Doubt Concerning Legality of the Pardon, Haaretz, June 26,
1986, at 1, col. 1; The Idea of Pardon-Deviation from the Rule of Law; Interview with Prof H.
Klinghoffer, id. at 2, col. 7.
16. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction is explained infra note 31 and accompanying text.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 23-31.
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The Supreme Court, in a lengthy and detailed opinion issued
within five weeks of the filing of the petitions, upheld the validity of
the pardons by a 2-1 vote. The decision, which ended merely one
stage of a political and legal controversy that shook Israel and at-
tracted world-wide attention, has major implications for human rights
and the rule of law in the State of Israel. At issue were secrecy and
security in a democracy under constant threat from hostile elements,
a democracy that yet prides itself on justice and the rule of law.
The President of Israel, an honorary figurehead who is said to
symbolize the State and be above politics, in this case descended to
the political battlefield in the supposed interest of national security.
In so doing, he politicized an office that has traditionally been non-
political and that has always been held in the highest public esteem.
His actions sent a message to the country-that leaders and agents of
the security forces can break the law, can commit murder, perjury,
and obstruction of justice, and do not then have to be brought to jus-
tice themselves. To all this the Supreme Court acquiesced, refusing to
break with what it saw as the established law of the land, that the
President's pardoning power, despite his otherwise powerless position,
is absolute. It was not for these judges, said the majority, to break
with tradition. Any change in the existing legal practice should come
from the legislature.
The primary goal of this article is to analyze critically the
Supreme Court's decision. In order to set the stage for the decision,
Section II examines the petitions to the Supreme Court. Section III
outlines preliminary developments in the stages between the filing of
the petitions and the issuance of the Court's decision five weeks later.
Section IV outlines the Supreme Court's decision, concentrating on
the major points the Court chose to analyze. Section V, in turn, criti-
cally examines the Court's decision. Section VI traces post-decision
developments, first in the Shin Beth Affair itself, and then briefly in a
second Supreme Court decision, the Nafsu case, which also involved
the Shin Beth and allegations of illegal interrogation practices by its
agents. Section VI concludes with a brief discussion of the Landau
Commission, which was established in the wake of the Nafsu affair to
investigate and report on allegations of a pattern of abuses by the Shin
Beth in its investigations. Finally, Section VII presents recommenda-
tions for reform of the law that has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court to permit the President to issue pre-conviction pardons.
Since this article's primary goal is to analyze the Court's decision
1989]
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upholding the Presidential pardons in the Shin Beth Case, its analysis
is limited by the Court's. It must be acknowledged at the outset, how-
ever, that the precise issue before the Court, though surely "constitu-
tional" in nature, was not the real issue. That issue, which was never
presented to the Court and is thus beyond the scope of this article, is
the question of how to control a secretive security agency charged
with protecting a democratic country against the very real dangers of
terrorism. What methods may the security agency employ to investi-
gate and to interrogate witnesses? What kind of oversight can or
should there be of the agency's actions? To whom should it be ac-
countable? What kinds of procedures should there be to investigate
alleged abuses by the security forces? How much may be known to
the public of the agency's functioning? The Israeli Supreme Court's
decision in the so-called Shin Beth Affair did not answer these ques-
tions. Indeed, they are the subject of continued scrutiny in Israel still
today. But the Court did touch upon a number of these questions in
the course of its analysis and so began a debate that has been ongoing.
The Shin Beth Affair, or so much of it as is dealt with in the
Court's 1986 decision, can be seen as a turning point for the Shin Beth
and for Israel. For although the President's pardons were upheld in
this particular case, there developed an awareness of fundamental
problems in the functioning of the Shin Beth, of a pattern of abuses
never before revealed to the public. This pattern of abuses came to
light as a result of events that can be seen as a direct outgrowth of
both the Shin Beth Affair and of a new sensibility on the part of the
Israeli public and legal establishment.' 8
II. THE PETITIONS TO THE SUPREME COURT
Several private attorneys filed individual petitions with the
Supreme Court in its function as the High Court of Justice.19 In some
of the petitions, the attorneys, civil rights and political activists, acted
on their own initiative; others represented groups of politicians. 20 In
18. The subsequent events, including the Supreme Court's decision in the Nafsu case in
May 1987 and the Landau Commission of Inquiry, which issued a report in November 1987,
are beyond the scope of this article. They are described briefly infra, Section VI, text accompa-
nying notes 196-232.
19. The Supreme Court's function as the High Court of Justice is explained infra note 31
and accompanying text.
20. At the preliminary hearing stage, on June 30 and July 1, 1986, there were five individ-
ual petitions, which the Court consolidated for argument. One of the petitioners was Amnon
Zichroni, a private attorney and civil rights activist, for whom the author of this article worked
during the summer of 1986 under the auspices of the Columbia Human Rights Internship
[Vol. 11:67
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one petition, twelve university law professors joined as petitioners and
were represented by a single attorney.21 Following the preliminary
hearing, the families of the two Palestinian hijackers who had been
beaten to death joined as petitioners. 22
The petitioners all shared two basic objectives: first, they asked
the Court to compel the police to investigate the killing of the Pales-
tinian hijackers at the hands of the Shin Beth agents; and second, they
challenged the validity of the pardons granted by President Herzog.
A. The Request for a Police Investigation
Once details of the murders were made public in the spring of
1986, various complaints were filed with the police, requesting that
they begin an investigation. 23 Amnon Zichroni24 filed a complaint
with the police on June 24, 1986 that reported both the murders of the
Palestinian hijackers and the various obstructions of justice that fol-
lowed. 25 He requested that the police begin an investigation in com-
program. Zichroni's petition was typical of those filed in that it named multiple defendants,
and this article will make specific reference to his petition.
Zichroni's petition named nine individual defendants: the Commissioner of Police; the
Attorney General; the Minister of Justice; the President of the State of Israel; Avrahan Sha-
lom, the head of the Shin Beth; Shalom's three aides who received pardons along with him and
who remained anonymous; and Yitzhak Shamir, Vice-Prime Minister and Foreign Minister,
who was Prime Minister at the time of the hijacking in April 1984. Zichroni Petition for
Order to Show Cause at 1 [hereinafter Zichroni Petition].
21. High Court [hereinafter H.C.] 448/86. The petitioners were represented by Michal
Shaked.
22. H.C. 463/86. The petitioners were Mohammed Abdullah Abu-Jama'a and Shahda
Hussein Abu-Jama'a, relatives of the two Palestinians who had been beaten to death, who were
cousins named Majdi and Subhi Abu-Jama'a. See D. SHIPLER, supra note 1, at 88. The fami-
lies were represented by Felicia Langer.
23. Among the complaints filed with the police was that of the former Attorney General,
Prof. Yitzhak Zamir. See Zichroni Petition at 2.
24. See supra note 20.
25. Zichroni's complaint to the police read as follows:
(a) Two of the hijackers of the bus who were captured alive by the I.D.F. [Israel
Defense Forces, i.e., the Army] on April 13, 1984 found their death afterward while
in custody. It is suspected that the two were murdered, allegedly in accordance with
an order of the head of the General Security Service (Shin Beth), who acted in this
matter on an order from and/or with the knowledge of then-Prime Minister, Mr.
Yitzhak Shamir.
(b) During the various investigative and legal proceedings in this matter that en-
sued, it is suspected that there was a complex array of obstructions of justice, alleg-
edly on orders of the head of the Shin Beth, who acted in this matter under the
orders of and/or with the knowledge of and/or the support and authorization of
then-Prime Minister, Mr. Yitzhak Shamir.
Brief for Zichroni at 2-3 (quoting the complaint). The "Brief for Zichroni," which was filed
with the Court in July 1986, after the preliminary hearings, is to be distinguished from
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pliance with the Criminal Procedure Law, which states that "[a]ny
person may complain to the police that an offence has been commit-
ted,"' 26 and states further that if the police "learns that an offence has
been committed" and that the offense is a felony, 27 "it shall open an
investigation."
28
In a letter to the Police Commissioner on June 26, 1986,
Zichroni emphasized that the Presidential pardons, even if valid, did
not remove the police's obligation to investigate. He pointed out that
other individuals who had not received pardons almost certainly were
involved; specifically, then-Prime Minister Shamir, who was in com-
mand of the Shin Beth at the time of the hijacking, had not received a
pardon.29
Zichroni's petition to the Supreme Court stated that the law's
mandatory language created a legal obligation that the police must
fulfill, and that the High Court of Justice was empowered to order the
police to perform its duty. Supreme Court precedent supported this
position and recognized a petitioner's standing to sue to enforce the
law where a statutory obligation existed, even absent "personal in-
jury" of the kind required by federal courts in the United States. 30
Zichron's Petition, see supra note 20, which was filed in late June, prior to the preliminary
hearings.
26. Criminal Procedure Law (Consolidated Version), 36 L.S.I. 35, 47, § 58 (1982).
27. The reported offenses included murder or manslaughter and their solicitation; per-
jury; obstruction of investigation; fabrication of evidence; and conspiracy to commit felony.
All of these offenses constituted "felonies." Zichroni Petition at 4. See also Brief for Zichroni
at 4 (citing Penal Law, L.S.I. Special Edition §§ 26, 27, 237, 238, 245, 298, 300, 499 (1977)).
28. Criminal Procedure Law, 36 L.S.I. at 47, § 59. The provision states in full:
Where the police, whether, by a complaint or in any other manner, learns that an
offence has been committed, it shall open an investigation. However, in the case of
an offence other than a felony, a police officer of the rank ofpakad (captain) or over
may direct that no investigation shall be held if he is of the opinion that no public
interest is involved or if another authority is legally competent to investigate the
offence.
The police are given discretion as to how to proceed in the case of an "offence" that is not
a "felony." The clear implication is that in the case of an offense that is a felony, the police
"shall open an investigation"-i.e., that the law grants the police no discretion in the matter.
29. Letter from Amnon Zichroni to Commissioner of Police (June 26, 1986).
30. Zichroni cited Segal v. Minister of the Interior, 34(IV) Piske Din [P.D.] (Law Re-
ports of the Supreme Court of Israel, Hebrew) 429, 434 (1980), in which Justice Barak stated
for the Supreme Court:
Where the law places an obligation on one of the authorities of government, and that
authority refuses to carry out the obligation for reasons that it believes are within its
discretion-believing that according to the correct interpretation of the law the obli-
gation must be removed because of its discretion-this Court will not allow that
governmental authority to cloak itself in the assertion that the petitioner lacks stand-
ing in order to prevent this Court from giving the law its correct interpretation.
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The Israeli Supreme Court is specifically empowered to order a gov-
ernmental authority to act when the law creates such an obligation. 31
B. The Challenge to the Validity of the Presidential Pardons
In granting the pardons to the head of the Shin Beth and his
three aides, the President acted under apparent authority of Basic
Law: The President of the State,3 2 which gives him the "power to
pardon offenders and to lighten penalties by the reduction or commu-
tation thereof." 3 President Herzog was aware of the controversial
nature of the pardons he granted, and he took the unusual step of
making a public announcement on television on the night of June 25,
1986, explaining the reasons for his decision:
I know that my decision is not simple and that not everyone will
agree with it, but I am familiar with both sides of the issue, both as
a jurist and as one who served as the head of intelligence services in
the Israel Defense Forces. I do not say that there is no truth to the
claims of those who oppose this action, but when I weighed the
considerations on both sides, I had to accept the responsibility and
decide in accordance with the public good as it appeared to me,
according to my knowledge and my conscience.
34
The petitioners asserted that the President had exceeded his au-
thority, since the law's use of the term "offenders" 35 necessarily re-
The Supreme Court of the United States has continued to require "personal injury" as a
prerequisite to a plaintiff's being allowed to present a claim in a federal court and has consist-
ently asserted that citizens do not have a legal interest in enforcement of the law. See, e.g.,
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War,
418 U.S. 208 (1974). See infra Section IV(B), text accompanying notes 55-58.
31. Courts Law, 11 L.S.I. 157, 158, § 7 (1957) provides in pertinent part:
(a) The Supreme Court sitting as a High Court of Justice shall deal with matters in
which it deems it necessary to grant relief in the interests of justice and which are not
within the jurisdiction of any other court or tribunal.
(b) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of subsection (a), the
Supreme Court sitting as a High Court of Justice shall be competent-
(2) to order State authorities, local authorities and officials of State authorities
or local authorities, and such other bodies and individuals as exercise any public
functions by virtue of law to do or refrain from doing any act in the lawful
exercise of their functions....
32. 18 L.S.I. 111 (1964).
33. Id. at 112, § 1 (b).
34. Elon, supra note 8, at 2, col. 3 (quoting the President's announcement).
35. "Offenders" is the word used in the Justice Ministry's official English translation of
the law (published in the series Laws of the State of Israel). The Hebrew term used in the law,
"avaryanim," is no clearer on the question of whether it includes someone who has not yet
been convicted. However, a standard dictionary definition of the word avaryan (singular form)
suggests that it refers to one who has committed an act that is a violation of law: "One who
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stricted the pardon to the post-conviction stage; until such time, the
accused is innocent and thus cannot be considered an "offender." De-
spite previous statements in dicta by the Supreme Court that the Pres-
ident's pardoning power was absolute and included the authority to
pardon prior to conviction, 36 this question had in fact never been in
direct issue and thus had not been decided by the Court. Zichroni
attached to his petition to the Supreme Court an official directive of
the former Attorney General, Yitzhak Zamir, which stated unequivo-
cally that "the President of the State is authorized, in accordance with
Section 11(b) of Basic Law: President of the State, to grant pardons
only to one who has been convicted in a court of law."' 37 Although
the President is immune from legal action "in respect of anything con-
nected with his functions or powers,"38 it is clearly established law
that if the President exceeds his authority and in fact acts without
authority, his action can be subject to judicial review, in what has
been referred to as an "indirect attack."
3 9
commits an offense." An example provided is: "The offender was brought to trial." A. EVEN-
SHOSHAN, HAMILON HEHADASH (The New Dictionary) 952 (Hebrew, 1983). The Supreme
Court did not resort to the dictionary definition, analyzing the word in context instead.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 59-62.
37. Directive of the Attorney General 21.333, quoted in Zichroni Petition at 6; also re-
ferred to in Brief for Zichroni at 11.
38. Basic Law: President, 18 L.S.I. at 113, § 13(a).
39. In Attorney General v. Matana, 16 P.D. 430 (1962), the Supreme Court entertained a
petition that claimed that the President lacked the authority to grant a conditional pardon.
While Basic Law: President (1964) had not yet been enacted, the Transition Law, 3 L.S.I. 3,
§ 6 (1949), granted to the President the power "to pardon offenders and to reduce punish-
ments." Presidential immunity was guaranteed at that time by the State President (Tenure)
Law, 6 L.S.I. at 5, § 9(a) (1951), which provided: "The President shall not be called to ac-
count before any court or tribunal in respect of a matter relating to his functions or pow-
ers .... "; and by § 9(b), which provided: "No legal action shall be taken against the President
during his tenure of office." Despite this personal immunity, the Court went to the merits of
the petition, holding that the President did indeed have the authority to grant a conditional
pardon.
The Matana case, discussed more fully infra text accompanying notes 108-18, was actu-
ally a rehearing by a five-justice panel of the Supreme Court of the original appeal, in which a
three-justice panel had ruled, per Justice Berinson, that the President did not have the author-
ity to grant a conditional pardon. Matana v. Attorney General (Matana 1), 14(11) P.D. 970
(1960). Upon the "further hearing," before a five-justice panel, provided for in Courts Law, I 
L.S.I. at 158, § 8, the Supreme Court reversed the earlier ruling. Matana I, however, contains
an important discussion of Presidential immunity, an obstacle that the Court had to overcome
in order to invalidate the conditional pardon granted by the President. This part of the hold-
ing was not overruled by the Court in the rehearing. Justice Berinson acknowledged that the
President enjoyed immunity "in respect of a matter relating to his functions or powers," by
virtue of § 9(a) of the State President (Tenure) Law, 6 L.S.I. at 5. Nevertheless, he stated:
If the President acts in a manner not in relation to his functions, he is, like any other
citizen, subject to the laws of the State and to the authority of the courts. Such is the
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Finally, the main thrust of Zichroni's petition attacked the par-
dons on the conceptual ground that the pre-conviction pardon vio-
lated the principle of separation of powers. According to this view,
which Zichroni expanded in his brief, "it was not the intent of the
legislature to create competition between the powers of the President
and the powers of the other branches of government as clearly defined
by law, branches that are subject to oversight by the courts and by the
Attorney General." 40 Were the situation otherwise, the President
would be able to frustrate the purposes of the other branches of
government.
III. PRELIMINARY DEVELOPMENTS
The various petitions were filed with the Supreme Court in the
days following the pardons of June 25, 1986. The Court consolidated
the petitions and ordered oral argument to take place immediately
before its most senior panel of justices.4' Oral argument was set for
case if the President purports to act within the scope of his functions and authority
but in fact exceeds them, for the courts must interpret the law in order to determine
the boundaries of the President's legal functions and power.... It is true that section
9(b) of the State President (Tenure) Law provides that "[n]o legal action shall be
taken against the President during his tenure of office," and that this means that even
if the President were to perform an act beyond his legal authority during his tenure in
office or even if he committed an illegal act, a court does not have the authority to
prosecute him while he is still President. This immunity continues only for the dura-
tion of his tenure and ends at the completion thereof, in contrast to the immunity
granted by section 9(a) of the law, which protects him against any legal action at any
time, after his tenure as well as during it. But this does not mean that it is impossible
to examine indirectly, without the President himself appearing as a party, the legality
of his actions and exercises of power that injure individuals. ... In this case, the
President exercised a power not granted to him, and thus it is a matter that exceeds
his functions and power .... Before us stands an order for review, and incidentally
the discussion requires us to decide whether the President's act was legal. This we
are empowered to do, since we are not judging the President, but rather the legality
of his act.
Matana I, 14(11) P.D. at 979-80 (emphasis added).
Justice Berinson's reasoning was implicitly endorsed by the Court upon the rehearing in
Matana, since the Court entertained the petition challenging the legality of the President's
conditional pardon.
An English translation of the rehearing of the Matana case (Matana II) was published in
4 SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL 112 (1962) [hereinafter S.J.].
All subsequent references will be to the English translation. The author of this article has
compared the translation against the original for accuracy and has made adjustments where
necessary.
40. Brief for Zichroni at 10. See also id. at 10-11. This point is touched upon briefly in
the petition for an order to show cause, as well. Zichroni Petition at 6.
41. The head of the Supreme Court has the title of "Nassi," which means "president."
To avoid confusion with the President of the State, the head of the Supreme Court, Meir
Shamgar, will be referred to as the Chief Justice (C.J.). The "Vice-President" of the Court,
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June 30.
At this preliminary stage the petitioners asked the Court to issue
an order to show cause directing the Police Commissioner and Attor-
ney General to detail why there should not be an investigation. The
petitioners also asked the Court to direct the President to justify his
pardons.
42
The Court first decided, after three hours of oral argument, to
strike the President as a defendant.4 3 This decision was in accordance
with Basic Law: President, which provides: "The President of the
State shall not be amenable to any court or tribunal, and shall be
immune from any legal act, in respect of anything connected with his
functions or powers."" The hearing continued into the night and
then resumed the next day.
At the close of the hearing on the evening of July 1, 1986, after a
total of more than ten hours of oral argument over the two days, the
justices retired to chambers for about half an hour. When they re-
turned, Chief Justice Shamgar read the Court's decision. The recipi-
ents of the pardons were ordered to provide declarations to the Court
within seven days, detailing the process of the requests for pardons.
The President's own considerations did not have to be detailed. The
Court would then decide, based on the declarations, whether to issue
a preliminary injunction or order further argument on the issue. The
Court issued an order with regard to the police investigation, in-
structing the concerned parties to show cause why the police should
not investigate the complaints presented to it, and to reply within 14
days. The decision was unanimous.45
Miriam Ben-Porat, will be referred to as the Vice-Chief Justice (V.C.J.). The third justice who
heard the petitions was Aharon Barak.
The Supreme Court consists of nine justices. A decision of a three-justice panel of the
Court may be appealed, at the discretion of the Court, to a panel of five or more justices.
Courts Law, II L.S.I. at 158, § 8(a).
42. E.g., Zichroni Petition, supra note 20. See supra Section II, text accompanying notes
19-40.
43. Shargai, Shin Beth Head: All My Actions Were Authorized, Haaretz, July 1, 1986, at
1, col. 4.
44. 18 L.S.I. at 113, § 13(a).
45. Shargai, High Court of Justice Issues Order to Detail Why Shin Beth Affair Should Not
Be Investigated, Haaretz, July 2, 1986, at 1, col. 1. The text of the order was as follows:
It has been decided that the respondents are to provide within 7 days affidavits
describing the process of the requests for the pardon that is the subject of these peti-
tions, including the grounds for their requests.
There is no need to provide an affidavit relating to the President's considerations
in the matter of the pardon. Once the affidavits are received, the Court will decide
whether it will hear additional claims relating to the pardon and whether the Court
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On July 19, Attorney General Harish recommended to Prime
Minister Peres and Foreign Minister Shamir that an official commis-
sion of inquiry be established to investigate the entire affair. Peres's
Labor Party supported the idea, while Shamir, unprotected by a Pres-
idential pardon and fearful of being implicated, vehemently opposed
it. 4 7 On July 14, the Government voted 14-11 not to establish a com-
mission of inquiry, with the Labor ministers voting in favor of estab-
lishing a commission, and the Likud Party's ministers, headed by
Shamir, opposing it. 4  Thereupon, Attorney General Harish an-
nounced that he would inform the Supreme Court of his intention to
order the police to investigate the claims made in the complaints
presented to it.49  On July 15, he so informed the Court. Legal
sources were of the opinion that the complaints would empower the
police to investigate not only agents of the Shin Beth, but also the
political echelon, including Vice-Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir.50 It
was reported in the press that, in light of the Attorney General's deci-
sion to order a police investigation, ten additional Shin Beth agents,
who had allegedly been involved in the murder of the Palestinian hi-
jackers and the subsequent coverup, planned to request Presidential
pardons. Legal sources suggested that if the Supreme Court upheld
the four pardons being challenged, the President would have no
choice but to pardon the other agents as well. 51
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION5
2
A. Introduction and Summary of Holding
After a second round of oral argument, on July 20, 1986, the
will see a need for the issuance of an order nisi [i.e., an order to show cause] as to the
validity of the pardons.
Order nisi as to the question of an investigation, as requested in the petitions,
assuming that the pardons are valid. Time for reply: 14 days. The decision is
unanimous.
Order Nisi as Requested in the Petitions, Haaretz, July 2, 1986, at 1, col. 5.
46. See supra note 4 (discussing commissions of inquiry).
47. Maariv, Special Supplement, July 18, 1986, at 19.
48. Eldar, By 14-11 Majority the Government Rejects the Suggestion of a Commission of
Inquiry, Haaretz, July 15, 1986, at 1, col. 4.
49. Elon, Harish to "Haaretz": Today I Will Announce to the High Court That I've De-
cided to Order the Police to Begin an Investigation, Haaretz, July 15, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
50. Id.
51. Eldar, More Than Ten Additional Shin Beth Agents Are About to Appeal to the Presi-
dent for Pardons, Haaretz, July 15, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
52. The decision, handed down on August 6, 1986, was issued, in Hebrew, in a 160-page
typescript, including the concurring and dissenting opinions. The case has since been
published in the official Supreme Court Reports series known in Hebrew as Piske Din. The
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Supreme Court issued its opinion on August 6. The three justices
were unanimous on the question of the police investigation: the issue
had been rendered moot by the Attorney General's July 15 announce-
ment that there would be an investigation, and by his statements at
oral argument that the investigation would be comprehensive.
53
On the question of the pardons themselves, Chief Justice Sham-
gar and Vice-Chief Justice Ben-Porat voted to uphold their validity,
while Justice Barak dissented from this holding. In his words, "the
pardon that the President of the State granted to the head of the Shin
Beth and his three aides is null and void, since the President acted
without authority. ' 54
B. Standing
The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction as fixed by law is quite
broad, and its role as the High Court of Justice is generally viewed as
the overseeing of government action. 55 The Court has, however, de-
veloped a discretionary system of prudential concerns to limit its
caseload; there is a general requirement that a plaintiff show "per-
sonal injury" and that his claim not be a generalized one common to
all citizens.
56
Nevertheless, the Israeli Supreme Court has shown willingness to
entertain "public actions" in extraordinary cases, despite the absence
of the type of "personal injury" that an American federal court would
require. Chief Justice Shamgar, in affirming that the petitioners had
standing to bring these claims, stated:
Even if it is true that none of these petitioners has an actual and
direct personal interest in the invalidation of the pardons, this is
not a reason to reject their claims outright. For this Court has
case is composed of seven individual petitions, which are simply listed in the official reporter in
the order in which docket numbers were assigned to them. The case is thus formally listed as
Barzilai v. Government of Israel, 40(111) P.D. 505 (1986). References will be to the official
reporter but will use the name Shin Beth Case. The individual petitions' docket numbers are
as follows: H.C. (High Court of Justice) 428/86; 429/86; 431/86; 446/86; 448/86; 463/86;
320/86.
53. Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D. at 565 (opinion of Shamgar, C.J.); id. at 583-84 (Ben-
Porat, V.C.J., concurring); id. at 586-87 (Barak, J., concurring on the question of the police
investigation).
54. Id. at 585 (Barak, J., dissenting).
55. See Courts Law, 11 L.S.I. at 158, § 7. See also supra note 31 and accompanying text.
See generally Shapira, Judicial Review Without A Constitution: The Israeli Paradox, 56 TEMP.
L.Q. 405 (1983).
56. See, eg., Ashkenazi v. Minister of Defense, 30(111) P.D. 309, 316-17 (1976)
(Shamgar, J.).
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already stated in the past that in certain circumstances when the
question raised is of a constitutional nature and is of a public char-
acter that directly impacts on the rule of law, it is desirable to take
a more liberal stance and open the Court's doors to such a peti-
tioner. .. [57] In the matter before us, the problems raised involve
the interpretation of Basic Law: President of the State for the pur-
pose of determining the scope of the President's pardoning power,
and thus we are justified in taking the liberal approach alluded to
above by opening the Court's doors before the petitioners. 58
C. Case Law Precedent
The Court relied heavily on the two cases in which the Presi-
dent's pardoning power had been at issue. It looked to previous
Supreme Court statements regarding the President's power to pardon
before conviction. Especially important to the Court's present deci-
sion was Attorney General v. Matana,59 which the Court referred to as
"the most basic and comprehensive decision on the subject of the par-
doning authority."0 In Matana, Vice-Chief Justice Agranat em-
braced his earlier statement in Reuven v. Chairman and Members of
the Law Council,61 reaffirming that the President's pardoning power
"is parallel, in its nature and in respect of the consequences which
flow from its exercise, to the power of pardon exercised by the King of
England.... The President has the power to pardon offenders both
before and after conviction, either unconditionally, or with qualifica-
tions. '62 While Chief Justice Shamgar noted that this statement had
not been the holding in the earlier case, Reuven, he emphasized that
Justice Agranat's view of the scope of the pardoning power was an
integral part of his opinion and was therefore to be accorded great
weight.6 3
57. Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D. at 558-59. See also Zichroni v. Broadcasting Authority,
37(I) P.D. 757, 762-63 (1983); Shiran v. Broadcasting Authority, 35(111) P.D. 365, 374 (1981);
Segal v. Minister of the Interior, 34(IV) P.D. 429, 434-35 (1980); id. at 440-43 (Barak, J.,
concurring).
58. Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D. at 559. Justice Barak concurred on this point. Id. at
586 (Barak, J., concurring with regard to petitioners' standing).
59. 16 P.D. 430, 4 S.J. 112 (1962).
60. Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D. at 521.
61. 5 P.D. 737 (1951).
62. Matana, 4 S.J. at 116 (quoting Reuven, 5 P.D. at 751 (Agranat, J., dissenting)).
63. Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D. at 520-21.
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D. Comparative Approach-Reliance on English and American
Views of Pardon
Justice Agranat, in his opinion in Reuven,64 made extensive refer-
ence both to the English monarch's and American President's par-
doning powers. In Justice Agranat's view, by discovering the nature
of the pardoning power of the English monarch and the American
President, the heads of state of the two common law countries that
served as models for the Israeli system of government, he could dis-
cover the proper nature of the pardoning power of the Israeli Presi-
dent. Justice Agranat found that the King's pardoning power was
absolute and included the power to pardon before conviction. 65 So,
too, the American President's power was broad, including the power
to grant full as well as conditional pardons, both before and after con-
viction.66 Justice Agranat concluded: "From this I learn that the [Is-
raeli] President has the authority to pardon offenders both before and
after conviction, either unconditionally, or with qualifications.
67
Chief Justice Shamgar referred to this reasoning and embraced it,
writing:
[Wlhile it is true that the subject is a matter of new and independ-
ent Israeli legislation, yet for the purpose of undersfanding its na-
ture it is permissible to be aided by reference to parallel powers in
those countries that served as a comparative model from which the
legislature drew when our law was enacted.68
E. Legislative Action and Inaction
The Reuven and Matana cases were decided before the Basic
Law was enacted in 1964. Prior to its enactment, the President's
powers were delineated in the Transition Law (1949),69 which em-
64. 5 P.D. 737 (1951).
65. Id. at 746-47 (Agranat, J., dissenting). See 8 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND Con-
stitutional Law 949 (4th ed. 1974) [hereinafter HALSBURY]. But see infra notes 148-55 and
accompanying text (explaining inappropriateness of relying on the English model).
66. Reuven, 5 P.D. at 748, 750 (Agranat, J., dissenting). See Ex parte Grossman, 267
U.S. 87 (1925); Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380-81 (1866). See also United States
v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833) (Marshall, C.J.) (Supreme Court will look to Eng-
lish law for rules prescribing the manner in which the pardoning power is to be used). But see
infra notes 156-63 and accompanying text (explaining inappropriateness of relying on the
American model).
67. Reuven, 5 P.D. at 751 (Agranat, J., dissenting).
68. Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D. at 522.
69. 3 L.S.I. 3 (1949).
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powered him "to pardon offenders and to reduce punishments."70
The issue in Matana was actually whether this statutory lan-
guage empowered the President to issue a conditional pardon. The
Supreme Court held that it did.7' Vice-Chief Justice Agranat's opin-
ion was wide-ranging and sought to describe the scope of the Presi-
dent's pardoning authority generally. 72 In so doing, he stated that the
President's power included the authority to pardon before
conviction.73
In 1964, when the Knesset enacted Basic Law: President, it
changed the language of the pardon provision to include "the power
to pardon offenders and to lighten penalties by the reduction or com-
mutation thereof,"'74 thus specifically embracing the Supreme Court's
holding in Matana regarding conditional pardons. The Knesset did
not change the law with respect to the power to pardon prior to con-
viction. From this silence, Chief Justice Shamgar reasoned that the
Knesset, which was obviously aware of the Matana decision when it
passed the new law, implicitly accepted the Court's broad reading,
including the power to pardon before conviction. 75
F. Statutory Language-the Meaning of the Term "Offenders"
The term "offenders" is not defined in the Basic Law or in the
Penal Law. 76 Chief Justice Shamgar adopted what he saw as the
"plain meaning" of the term "offender"-that it meant someone who
had committed an "offense" as defined by law, and did not require
that the person be convicted of that offense in order to be eligible to
receive a pardon. 77 He specifically referred, for purposes of compari-
70. Id. § 6.
71. For a description of the case, see infra text accompanying notes 108-18.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 59-62.
73. 4 S.J. at 116.
74. 18 L.S.I. at 112, § 11(b) (emphasis added).
75. Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D. at 525-26.
76. Penal Law, L.S.I. Special Edition (1977). Chief Justice Shamgar himself so noted.
Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D. at 529.
77. Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D. at 530 (emphasis in original):
According to the plain meaning of the words, an offender is one who has committed
an act defined as an offense, and there is nothing in the term itself to suggest that the
legislature employed the terms "offense" and "offender," as the case may be, to refer
specifically to one against whom it has been proven, in a criminal adjudication that
ends in conviction, that the individual committed an offense.
Chief Justice Shamger, having noted that the term "offender" is not defined in Basic Law:
President, see supra note 76 and accompanying text, compared other usages of the term in
various statutes to support this interpretation. For example, he cited section 3 of the Police
Ordinance (New Version) (1971), which provides that the "Israel police force shall engage in
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son, to the provision in the U.S. Constitution giving the President the
"power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United
States,"'78 which has been interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court to
include the power to issue pre-conviction pardons.79
G. Holding vs. Dictum in Reuven and Matana
Chief Justice Shamgar acknowledged that the broad statements
in Reuven and Matana regarding the President's pardoning power
were, strictly speaking, dicta, but he nevertheless concluded:
The holding of the majority in Matana is the conclusion that the
President's power is in fact the product of an original and in-
dependent Israeli law, but that nevertheless the legislature inten-
tionally designed it in accordance with the English and American
systems, which served as prototypes.80
Chief Justice Shamgar further observed that the broad state-
ments in Matana regarding the pre-conviction pardon and the par-
doning power generally were in fact an integral part of the justices'
view of the power, and as such were not to be dismissed merely be-
cause they went beyond the narrow issue of the case.8'
H. Nature of the Pardoning Power
The Court undertook an analysis of the nature of the pardoning
power of heads of state of various countries throughout the world,
both common law and non-common law. It found that "there is not
one model only and that almost every legal system has developed a
special approach that corresponds appropriately to the other govern-
mental authorities that exist within it.' '82 It found that the fact that in
France and Germany, for example, the President is empowered to
pardon only after conviction was not instructive, since those nations
the prevention of offenses and in their discovery, in the apprehension of offenders, and in their
prosecution." Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D. at 530 (quoting Police Ordinance). Chief Justice
Shamgar placed emphasis on the phrase "in the apprehension of offenders" for the purpose of
demonstrating that the term "offenders" in this context obviously referred to individuals who
had not yet been convicted.
78. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (emphasis added).
79. Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D. at 532. See, e.g., Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
333, 380-81 (1866). See also supra note 66 and accompanying text; infra notes 156-60 and
accompanying text.
80. Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D. at 533.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 550. See Sebba, The Pardoning Power-A World Survey, 68 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 83 (1977).
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had not served as models for the Israeli legislature when it granted the
pardoning power to the President.8 3
The Court explained that in analyzing the pardoning power, the
nature of the power itself, and not the particular governmental au-
thority exercising it, should be emphasized. Thus, the nature of the
President's office was immaterial. The concept of pardon in the An-
glo-American system was clear, and this was the background against
which to determine the scope of the Israeli President's pardoning
power. 84
. Nature of the Basic Law
All three justices agreed that the Basic Law, which defined the
President's powers, was constitutional in nature, even in the absence
of a formal, written constitution.8 5 They did not agree, however, on
the significance this had when it came to interpreting the law.
Chief Justice Shamgar, writing for the majority, found that the
law's constitutional quality required that it be interpreted with a "spa-
83. Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D. at 551.
84. Id. at 549-52.
85. The so-called "Basic Laws," sometimes referred to as "Fundamental Laws," are indi-
vidual acts of legislation that define the functions of the various governmental bodies. This
subject is a complex one that has troubled Israeli legislators and legal scholars and is beyond
the scope of this article. For present purposes it must suffice to say that the Israeli legislature,
the Knesset, originally intended to adopt a written constitution. However, this was not done,
and instead it was decided to create individual laws defining the functions and powers of the
various governmental bodies. In this way, a constitution would be built up "chapter by chap-
ter." See generally H. SACHAR, A HISTORY OF ISRAEL 356-57 (1976). The Transition Law, 3
L.S.I. 3 (1949), which defined the functions of the Knesset, the President of the State, and the
Government, and was the predecessor to the Basic Laws, was referred to by the Supreme
Court in Matana as "a 'constitution' in miniature." 4 S.J. at 120.
It is generally agreed that the Basic Laws, like the Transition Law before them, are of a
constitutional nature, despite their being enacted in the same way as ordinary legislation. The
"constitutional nature" of the Basic Laws takes on great significance when a court attempts to
interpret them. See infra text accompanying notes 164-69.
The Basic Laws enacted to date, in addition to Basic Law: President (1964), are: Basic
Law: The Knesset, 12 L.S.I. 85 (1958); Basic Law: Israel Lands, 14 L.S.I. 48 (1960); Basic
Law: The Government, 22 L.S.I. 257 (1968); Basic Law: The State Economy, 29 L.S.I. 273
(1975); Basic Law: The Army, 30 L.S.I. 150 (1976); Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, 34
L.S.I. 209 (1980); Basic Law: Adjudication (1984) (not yet published in L.S.I.). For further
discussion, see L. Kohn, Foreword to FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL (Badi
ed. 1961); A. RUBINSTEIN, HAMISHPAT HAKONSTITUTSIYONI SHEL MEDINAT YISRAEL
(Constitutional Law of the State of Israel) 276-90 (Hebrew, 3d ed. 1980); Gavison, The Contro-
versy Over Israel's Bill of Rights, 15 ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 113 (1985); Shamgar, On the
Written Constitution, 9 ISRAEL L. REV. 467 (1974). See also Bergmann v. Minister of Finance,
23(I) P.D. 693 (1969) (Held: A law contradicting an "entrenched provision"--i.e., a provision
that requires a special majority of the Knesset to amend it--of a Basic Law is null and void.).
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cious view," and that this led to a finding that the pardoning power
was broad. 6 He also suggested that the law's constitutional quality
required that any change from settled practice be made only after the
most searching inquiry.87
J. National Security vs. The Rule of Law
The petitioners had claimed that the President's pardons would
serve to shield the truth, even given the fact that there would be a
police investigation. They urged that the rule of law not be
subordinated to supposed concerns of national security. Petitioner
Zichroni wrote in his brief to the Court:
The entire affair creates the impression that things were done that
no developed country should allow to be swept under the rug. The
"purity of arms" of the security forces, as well as the integrity of
the investigatory authorities, who everyday investigate dozens of
citizens, and who give testimony before courts in Israel and the
Occupied Territories, are matters that go to the very soul of the
society, matters that impact upon all citizens of this country. 88
The Court found, however, that the rule of law had a different
meaning from that urged upon it. The Court acknowledged that "a
proper government is one that guards the existence of the rule of law,
for that is what serves as a guard-wall against anarchy.., and ensures
human rights."' 89 But, the Court continued, a government is not able
to function properly unless it possesses full knowledge of all that takes
place within its territories. 90 The Court concluded that "[t]his does
not require that everyone know everything; to the contrary-there are
certain circumstances, certain subjects, and certain details that
although they are governed by law, knowledge of them is reserved to
a select few." 91 Thus, a full investigation into the killing of the Pales-
tinian hijackers, including prosecution of the Shin Beth agents in-
volved, would result in revealing information regarding the operations
86. Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D. at 521. In this context, Chief Justice Shamgar cited the
Matana case, in which Vice-Chief Justice Agranat referred to Justice Frankfurter's statement
in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 596 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring), that interpreting the Constitution "requires... a spacious view." Matana, 4 S.J.
at 123.
87. Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D. at 548.
88. Brief for Zichroni at 16.
89. Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D. at 555.
90. Id. The reference is to the intelligence services, namely the Shin Beth, which is re-
sponsible for internal security and the fight against terrorism.
91. Id.
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of the intelligence forces and would damage national security.92
K. Standard of Review
The Court determined that the Basic Law's language, "[t]he
President of the State shall have power to pardon offenders," 93 granted
to the President discretionary authority with which the Court should
not interfere. 94 The Court explained that it may determine whether a
governmental authority has acted as an authority of its stature is sup-
posed to act. The degree of deference to the authority's actions de-
pends on the nature of the governmental body. The Court does not
substitute its judgment for that of the administrator, but rather "inter-
feres only when it is of the opinion that no reasonable governmental
authority of its defined status could have arrived at the conclusion
that it did." 95
Various petitioners questioned whether the President had had
sufficient information on which to base his decision. But the Govern-
ment in its response to the Court stated that the President was
presented with "full information" and that he met twice with one of
the recipients of the pardons. 96 The Court noted that it was unusual
that he meet with a recipient at all. 97 The Court concluded that once
it was certain that the President had had full information regarding
the nature of the crimes that had been committed, both from the oral
and written confessions made by the four men who requested the par-
dons, there was no room for the Court to interfere with the Presi-
dent's exercise of discretion.98
92. Vice-Chief Justice Ben-Porat explained in her concurring opinion that when the par-
doning power is used there is a conflict between two important interests---equality before the
law, which requires that everyone who commits a crime be brought to justice; and protecting
some essential interest for which the pardon was granted. In this case, the President had
weighed the interests and determined that essential national security concerns dictated that the
pardons be granted. Id. at 574-75 (Ben-Porat, V.C.J., concurring).
93. 18 L.S.I. at 112, § 11(b) (emphasis added).
94. Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D. at 556-57. The Court quoted an earlier opinion in
which it had stated: "Even if the President acted on mistaken advice or even if the President
erred in exercising his discretion, this would not affect the legal validity of his decision. This
Court does not sit to consider appeals against the President's decisions." Barzilai v. Prime
Minister of Israel, 31(111) P.D. 671, 672 (1977).
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V. ANALYSIS AND CRmICIsM OF THE DECISION
A. The Precedents Relied upon by the Court Were Not Dispositive
of the Issue
The decisions of the Supreme Court are binding upon all lower
courts, while the Supreme Court itself is not bound by its own previ-
ous decisions.99 Still, the Court is reluctant to depart from what it
sees as settled precedent. The two cases relied upon by the Supreme
Court in the present case, however, were not dispositive of the ques-
tion of the President's authority to pardon before conviction.
1. Reuven v. Chairman and Members of the Law Council O°
Reuven, an attorney, was convicted in 1944 of a crime under sec-
tion 109 of the Criminal Code Ordinance (1936)101 and was sentenced
to six months in prison. After he had served his sentence, the Law
Council decided to revoke his license. 10 2 Upon the establishment of
the State of Israel in 1948, Reuven requested a Presidential pardon,
which was granted in 1950 as a means of helping him return to his
former profession. After the pardon, Reuven requested that the Law
Council return his name to the Roll of Advocates so that he could
resume his practice. The Council refused, and Reuven brought suit in
the High Court of Justice to compel the Council to restore his
license. 10
3
99. Courts Law, 11 L.S.I. at 163, § 33.
100. 5 P.D. 737 (1951).
101. Reuven's offense was not detailed in the report of the case. Section 109 of the Crimi-
nal Code Ordinance of 1936 deals with "public officers receiving property to show favour,"
according to the marginal notation, and provides as follows:
Any person who, being employed in the public service, receives any property or bene-
fit of any kind for himself, on the understanding, express or implied, that he shall
favour the person giving the property or conferring the benefit, or any one in whom
that person is interested, in any transaction then pending, or likely to take place,
between the person giving the property or conferring the benefit, or any one in whom
he is interested, and any person employed in the public service, is guilty of a misde-
meanour, and is liable to imprisonment for two years or to a fine of one hundred
pounds or to both such penalties.
Criminal Code Ordinance No. 74 of 1936, Supplement No. 1 to the Palestine Gazette Ex-
traordinary No. 652 of 14th December 1936, in I GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE, ORDI-
NANCES, REGULATIONS, RULES, ORDERS AND NOTICES, ANNUAL VOLUME FOR 1936, at
319.
102. The Law Council was charged with licensing and regulating the legal profession in
Mandate Palestine. Law Council Ordinance No. 33 of 1938, in 1 GOVERNMENT OF PALES-
TINE, ORDINANCES, REGULATIONS, RULES, ORDERS AND NOTICES, ANNUAL VOLUME FOR
1938, at 105-07.
103. Reuven, 5 P.D. at 739-44.
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The High Court held that the Law Council was not authorized
by law to return an individual's name to the Roll of Advocates once it
had been stricken for cause and that therefore the Court could not
order the Council to act.' °4
Reuven had pleaded his Presidential pardon, claiming that it
served to erase his guilt, thus removing the basis upon which the
Council had revoked his license. But the Court declared that, having
determined that the Council did not have the power to return a name
to the Roll, it need not reach the question of the effect of the
pardon. 105
Justice Agranat, in dissent, argued that the effect of the Presi-
dent's pardon was to erase the guilt of the convicted man, thus remov-
ing the basis for the Council's action. He relied upon English and
American views of pardon as serving to erase guilt and make the indi-
vidual, as it were, a new man.' °6 He examined the English and Amer-
ican views of pardon generally in order to determine the scope and
effect of pardons in common law systems, finding that both the Eng-
lish monarch and the American President had absolute power to issue
pardons at any stage of legal proceedings. He concluded: "From this
I learn that the President [of Israel] has the authority to pardon of-
fenders both before and after conviction, whether unconditionally or
conditionally; additionally, that the granting of an unconditional par-
don serves to erase the conviction and to remove all penalties result-
ing therefrom."'' 0 7
Justice Agranat's opinion, however, was a dissent and ranged far
beyond the question in issue. Therefore, the Supreme Court was mis-
taken in relying on its analysis when it decided the Shin Beth Case.
104. Id. at 744-45.
105. Id. at 745 (opinion of Heshin, J.). Justice Zilberg concurred. Id.
106. Id. at 745-56 (Agranat, J., dissenting). In support of his view of the pardoning power
of the British monarch, Justice Agranat cited Hay v. Justices of the Tower Division of
London, 24 Q.B.D. 561 (1890). For a discussion of Hay, see infra note 153. See also 8 HALS-
BURY, supra note 65, 1 952 ("The effect of a pardon under the Great Seal is to clear the person
from all infamy, and from all consequences of the offence for which it was granted, and from
all statutory or other disqualifications following upon conviction. It makes him, as it were, a
new man .. "). In support of his view of the American President's pardoning power, Justice
Agranat cited Exparte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925), and Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
333, 380-81 (1866). For a discussion of the American President's pardoning power, see infra
notes 156-63 and accompanying text.
107. Reuven, 5 P.D. at 751.
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2. Matana v. Attorney General 0 8
Matana involved a challenge to the President's authority to grant
a conditional pardon. The Supreme Court held that the Transition
Law (1949), 109 granting the President the power "to pardon offenders
and to reduce punishments," 10 included the authority to grant condi-
tional pardons.
Matana had been convicted of attempted murder and sentenced
to three years in prison. 11  After he had served sixteen months of the
sentence, President Yitzhak Ben-Zvi issued a "Warrant for the Re-
duction of Punishment," substituting for the three-year sentence the
sixteen months already served and adding the condition that if
Matana committed any of a set of specified offenses he was to serve an
additional twenty months in prison. 112 Matana later committed a sec-
ond offense of attempted murder in breach of the condition attached
to the pardon, for which the district court sentenced him to four
years' imprisonment and in addition activated the conditional sen-
tence of twenty months to run consecutively with the four-year sen-
tence. 113 Matana challenged the conditional pardon on the grounds
that the President had exceeded his authority.' 14 The Supreme Court
held that the Transition Law empowered the President to grant a con-
ditional pardon. 15
Vice-Chief Justice Agranat, this time writing for the majority,
stated: "The narrow and specific problem ... is whether the President
is empowered to impose any conditions on the grant of a pardon or
reduction of a sentence in a particular case."' 16 Nevertheless, he em-
108. 16 P.D. 430, 4 S.J. 112 (1962).
109. 3 L.S.I. 3 (1949).
110. Id. §6.
111. The criminal appeal to the Supreme Court is reported in Attorney General v. Matana
and Yosef, 10 P.D. 142 (1956). The co-defendant, Naim Yosef, was acquitted.
112. Matana, 4 S.J. at 115.
113. Id. at 116.
114. Id.
115. The Court's specific holding on the validity of the conditional pardon appears at 4
S.J. at 142. For a similar American case, with a similar result, see Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256
(1974).
The Matana case was actually a rehearing by a five-justice panel of the Supreme Court of
the original appeal, in which a three-justice panel had ruled, per Justice Berinson, that the
President did not have the authority to grant a conditional pardon. Matana v. Attorney Gen-
eral (Matana 1), 14(11) P.D. 970 (1960). See supra note 39 (discussing the Court's analysis of
Presidential immunity). The Court's decision in Matana I was unanimous: Justices Zilberg
and Landau concurred without opinion. 14(11) P.D. at 980.
116. 4 S.J. at 115.
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braced his earlier statements in Reuven 117 and once again sought to
describe the President's pardoning power generally. While this time
in the majority, his statements regarding the pardoning power gener-
ally, including his statement that "the President has the power to par-
don offenders both before and after conviction,"' 18 were beyond the
question in issue and thus not part of the holding of the case.
3. The Court Was Not Bound by Its Previous Statements
Basic Law: Adjudication (1984) states: "A decision rendered by
the Supreme Court is binding upon all courts except the Supreme
Court."' 19 Reuven and Matana, as we have seen, were not binding
precedents. Even if Matana was considered a precedent on the ques-
tion of pre-conviction pardon, however, the Supreme Court need not
have been bound by it.
The courts in Israel recognize the distinction between holding
and dictum. Justice Barak, dissenting in the Shin Beth Case, quotes a
statement by Justice Agranat in a recent article: "Once the Supreme
Court has interpreted a provision of a law that was at issue in the
dispute before it as it saw it, this interpretation becomes part of the
law."' 120 But, Justice Barak emphasized,
this statement is true only with regard to the holding of the case
and not with regard to dicta. The rationale for this is that the
judge does not feel the same responsibility when he writes dicta as
when he writes the actual holding of a case. Since he knows that
dicta are not binding, he is likely to feel freer with regard to
them. 121
B. The President's Pardoning Power Should Be Interpreted in the
Overall Context of His Powers
It is submitted that the Court's approach to the question at issue,
by which it viewed the institution of pardon as a neutral principle
117. See supra text accompanying notes 106-07.
118. 4 S.J. at 116 (quoting Reuven, 5 P.D. at 751 (Agranat, J., dissenting)).
119. Basic Law: Adjudication § 20(b) (1984) (not yet published in L.S.I.), quoted in
Barak, Overruling Precedent, 21 ISRAEL L. REv. 269, 269 (1986) (citing SEFER HAHUKIM no.
1110, at 78).
120. Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D. at 616 (Barak, J., dissenting) (quoting Agranat, The
Contribution of the Judicial Branch to the Making of Law, 10 IYUNEI MISHPAT [Tel Aviv U.L.
Rev.] 233, 244 (Hebrew, 1983-84) (emphasis added)).
121. Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D. at 616 (Barak, J., dissenting).
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having universal meaning, 22 was mistaken. If it is a constitution we
are expounding, and all agree that the Basic Laws are constitutional
in nature, 23 then we must look at the President's place in the overall
governmental structure.
The President of Israel is a figurehead largely devoid of substan-
tive powers. His position is representative and symbolic; he is said to
symbolize the State. 124 Professor Klinghoffer, a noted constitutional
authority, writes:
His powers are formal and have no decisive weight in the constitu-
tional structure of the State. The President of the State is not
elected by the people; he does not have a veto power against the
laws passed by the Knesset; and he does not have the power to
dissolve the Knesset. He has no authority to appoint administra-
tors; and he is not the Commander-in-Chief of the Israel Defense
Forces.
125
Similarly, Professor Rubinstein, another noted authority, writes:
"Few heads of state ... are as devoid of power as is the President of
Israel." 1
26
Such a view of the office of the President is inescapable when the
122. In Matana, Vice Chief Justice Agranat stated:
Not only do the expressions "pardon" and "reduction of punishments" have a uni-
versal meaning, but the power of pardon, in its scope under the common law, is the
power which passed to the Provisional Government by virtue of Section 14 of the
Law and Administration Ordinance, 1948, and was known to local jurists at the time
when that provision was framed.
4 S.J. at 134. Even more telling is the approach taken by Justice Cohen in his concurring
opinion in Matana. To discern the meaning of the modern Hebrew verb lahon (to pardon; root
h-n-n), he looked to its usage in the Bible:
The expression "pardon" in the Hebrew language has from earliest times involved an
element of free and unfettered will, even of arbitrariness. The phrase "and I will be
gracious to whom I will be gracious [ahon, root h-n-n, i.e., I will pardon], and I will
show mercy on whom I will show mercy" (Exodus 33:19) is interpreted by Rashi to
mean "I shall be gracious on those occasions that I wish to be gracious."
Id. at 148 (Cohen, J., concurring). Justice Cohen did not say that the quoted words from
Exodus are spoken by no mere mortal, nor even by an elected figurehead of government, but
by God Himself.
123. See supra note 85.
124. See Union of Travel and Tourism Agents in Israel v. Koppel Tours Ltd., 29(11) P.D.
799, 800 (1975) ("The President symbolizes the State."); Matana v. Attorney General (Matana
1), 14(11) P.D. 970, 979 (1960) ("With the intention of protecting the honor of the State that
the President personifies.. . he was granted a certain immunity to suit ...."), rev'd on other
grounds, 16 P.D. 430, 4 S.J. 112 (1962) ("further hearing" in accordance with Courts Law, 11
L.S.I. at 158-59, § 8).
125. H. KLINGHOFFER, MISHPAT KONSTrrUTSIYONI (Constitutional Law) 489 (Hebrew,
1965).
126. A. RUBINSTEIN, HAMISHPAT HAKONSTITUTSIYONI SHEL MEDINAT YISRAEL
(Constitutional Law of the State of Israel) 391 (Hebrew, 3d ed. 1980).
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Basic Law is examined as a whole. Although the law begins by stat-
ing that "a President shall stand at the head of the State," 127 it has
been urged that "an erroneous conclusion as to the status and impor-
tance of the Presidency in Israel ought not to be drawn therefrom.' 128
In Israel, the President is not the head of the executive branch; rather,
executive powers are concentrated in the hands of the Government. 129
Of the 27 sections of Basic Law: President, only section 11 deals with
the President's "functions and powers," as the marginal notation
states.130 Section 11 (a) delineates, in six subsections, several ministe-
rial functions, each of which uses the mandatory language "shall."
The President thus performs these functions, such as signing every
law,131 without the possibility of exercising any discretion. 132 Section
11 (c) states that the President "shall carry out every other function
and have every other power assigned to him by Law." 133 This has
only led to the President's being assigned more formal duties, such as
opening the Knesset.134
In fact, the President's only substantive "power" is that of the
pardon, in section 11 (b). That power must, in turn, be interpreted
with regard to the office as a whole. In this regard, it is instructive to
127. 18 L.S.I. at 111, § 1.
128. Bracha, The Constitutional Position, the Pardoning Power and Other Powers of the
President of the State of Israel, 9 ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 190, 190 (1979).
129. Basic Law: The Government provides: "The Government is the executive authority
in the State." 22 L.S.I. 257, § 1 (1968).
130. Section 11 of Basic Law: The President of the State provides in full as follows:
(a) The President of the State-
(1) shall sign every Law, other than a law relating to his powers;
(2) shall take action to achieve the formation of a Government and shall re-
ceive the resignation of the Government in accordance with Law;
(3) shall receive from the Government a report of its meetings;
(4) shall accredit the diplomatic representatives of the State, shall receive the
credentials of diplomatic representatives sent to Israel by foreign states, shall
empower the consular representatives of the State and shall confirm the appoint-
ments of consular representatives sent to Israel by foreign states;
(5) shall sign such conventions with foreign states as have been ratified by the
Knesset;
(6) shall carry out every function assigned to him by Law in connection with
the appointment and removal from office of judges and other office-holders.
(b) The President of the State shall have power to pardon offenders and to lighten
penalties by the reduction or commutation thereof.
(c) The President of the State shall carry out every other function and have every
other power assigned to him by Law.
18 L.S.I. at 112.
131. Id. § l1(a)(1).
132. Bracha, supra note 128, at 194, 203-13.
133. 18 L.S.I. at 112, § 11(c).
134. Bracha, supra note 128, at 213.
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compare the Israeli President to the American President, who holds
'[t]he executive power" 135 and who is "Commander-in-chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several
States when called into the actual service of the United States."' 13
6 It
is also instructive to note that a federal district court, in dismissing a
challenge to the validity of President Ford's pardon of Richard M.
Nixon, wrote: "The Court observes that the Pardoning Power is in
the same section of the Constitution which makes the President Com-
mander-in-Chief of the armed forces.' 37 The Israeli President's par-
doning power, on the other hand, should be informed by its place
within a structure of formal duties that carry with them no discretion
and that have no substantive effect on the workings of the State.1 38
C. Reliance on the Comparison to the Pardoning Powers of the
English Monarch and American President Is Misplaced
The Court sought to discover the nature of the President's par-
doning power by analyzing the pardoning powers of the English mon-
arch and the American President. 139  Before criticizing this
comparative approach, it must first be understood why it would be
undertaken at all. If the Israeli President's pardoning power had been
delegated to him in some way, such a comparison might be profitable.
But such is not the case. Chief Justice Shamgar himself noted that
"the subject is a matter of new and independent Israeli legislation." 140
During the period of the British Mandate, 1922-1948, Great Brit-
ain ruled Palestine through an officer of the Crown known as the
High Commissioner. His duties and powers, which were delegated to
him by the King, included the power to pardon an accomplice to a
crime so as to allow the accomplice to give evidence to aid in the
prosecution of the principal offender. The High Commissioner was
also empowered to "grant to any offender convicted of any crime or
135. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
136. Id. § 2.
137. Murphy v. Ford, 390 F. Supp. 1372, 1373 (W.D. Mich. 1975). See also McCord v.
Ford, 398 F. Supp. 750 (D.D.C. 1975) (same result); Williams v. United States, 82-1 T.C. 9138
(S.D. W. Va. 1981) (taxpayer challenge to President Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon
rejected).
138. For discussions of the Israeli President's office generally, see B. AKZIN, MISHPAT
KONSTITUTSIYONI (Constitutional Law) 253-93 (Hebrew, 1966); H.E. BAKER, THE LEGAL
SYSTEM OF ISRAEL 12-20 (1968), H. KLINGHOFFER, supra note 125, at 489-521; A. RUBIN-
STEIN, supra note 126, at 391-400; Bracha, supra note 128.
139. See supra Section IV(D), text accompanying notes 64-68.
140. Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D. at 522.
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offence ... a pardon, either free or subject to lawful conditions.' 4'
The High Commissioner was the chief executive officer of the Crown
in Mandate Palestine. 142 His powers were strictly delegated powers,
and their content was to be determined by reference to the source
from which they emanated-that is, the King.
Not so the office of the President of Israel. The position was
created as the result of a political compromise by Israel's first Prime
Minister, David Ben-Gurion, to provide a position of prominence to
Dr. Chaim Weizmann. Dr. Weizmann had for many years been the
President of the World Zionist Organization and enjoyed great pres-
tige among the Jewish population in Palestine and abroad. Ben-Gu-
rion sought to create an honorary position of symbolic importance,
without relinquishing the Government's executive authority. The of-
fice of the President of the State was the result.
43
The President's functions were first set forth in the Transition
Law of 1949.'44 This power was, as Justice Agranat wrote in Matana,
"an original power which finds its proper place in a document which
is the 'Constitution in miniature' of an independent State .... [T]he
Israeli legislature neither copied nor omitted, but built its law as an
independent structure."'' 45 Thus, it is clear that the President's pow-
ers were not delegated to him by any foreign authority. The only
question that remains is whether the Knesset modeled the Presidency
on the English or American examples.
Justice Barak addressed this question at length in his dissent. He
sought to determine the intent of the legislature, and he sought to
identify what models, if any, it had used in framing the Transition
Law. The proceedings of the Constitution and Law Committee of the
141. Palestine Order in Council § 16 (1922), in 3 THE LAWS OF PALESTINE 2574 (H.
Drayton ed. 1934) (emphasis added). The full provision reads:
When any crime or offence has been committed within Palestine, or for which the
offender may be tried therein, the High Commissioner may, as he should see occa-
sion, grant a pardon to any accomplice in such crime or offence who shall give such
information and evidence as shall lead to the conviction of the principal offender or
of any such offenders if more than one; and further may grant to any offender con-
victed of any crime or offence in any court or before any Judge, or Magistrate, within
Palestine a pardon, either free or subject to lawful conditions, or any remission of
sentence passed on such offender, or any respite of the execution of such sentence, for
such period as the High Commissioner thinks fit, and may, as he shall see occasion,
remit any fines, penalties or forfeitures which may accrue or become payable in vir-
tue of the judgment of any Court or Magistrate in Palestine.
142. Id. § 5.
143. Bracha, supra note 128, at 190-92, 222-24.
144. 3 L.S.I. 3, ch. 2.
145. 4 S.J. at 124.
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Knesset are closed, and Justice Barak noted that the Court did not
have access to the protocols of those meetings. Former Attorney
General Zamir had viewed the protocols, however, and Justice Barak
quoted his statement that the legislature had intended to grant the
President the authority to pardon only after conviction.'" Justice
Barak stated further, however, that the materials available to the
Court were not sufficiently explicit on the issue of the source of "in-
spiration" for the pardoning power, and thus it fell to the Court to
determine the question.1
47
As discussed in the preceding section, the President's pardoning
power should be determined in the context of his powers generally, as
well as his constitutional position in the Israeli system of government.
When viewed in this light, any reliance on the models of the English
monarch or the American President is seen to be inappropriate.
The English monarch's pardoning power was thought tradition-
ally to be part of the royal prerogative, the set of residuary, non-statu-
tory powers reserved to the Crown. 148 The pardoning power was
traditionally absolute, 49 and as part of the royal prerogative was not
subject to judicial review.1 50
But in fact the situation in England has changed to accommodate
the changed nature of the monarchy. The power is actually exercised
today by the Home Secretary, who is then accountable to Parlia-
ment.1 51 The potential arbitrariness of the power has thus been signif-
icantly mitigated. Moreover, it appears that the pre-conviction
pardon, which traditionally was used for the sole purpose of obtaining
the testimony of an accomplice to aid in prosecution of the primary
offender,152 has fallen into disuse.' 53  Some commentators have
146. Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D. at 593 (Barak, J., dissenting).
147. Id.
148. See generally 8 HALSBURY, supra, note 65, $ 889-1082; H.W.R. WADE, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW 213-15 (5th ed. 1982).
149. See 8 HALSBURY, supra note 65, $ 949-52.
150. Id. 951.
151. A.T.H. Smith, The Prerogative of Mercy, the Power of Pardon and Criminal Justice,
1983 PUBLIC LAW 398, 426.
152. Id. at 413.
153. S.A. DE SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 128 n.124 (1971)
("It would seem that a pardon may be granted before conviction; but this power is never
exercised. The line between pardon before conviction and the unlawful exercise of dispensing
power is thin.") (emphasis in original).
Although the specific question of the validity of a pre-conviction pardon does not appear
to have been addressed by the English courts, the case law does reflect the erosion of the
absolute nature of the pardoning power referred to by the commentators. The traditional
[V/ol. 11:67
1989] The Shin Beth Affair 97
claimed that the power to grant pre-conviction pardons has in fact
disappeared, atrophied as a result of disuse, though these claims are
position is presented in Hay v. Justices of the Tower Division of London, 24 Q.B.D. 561
(1890). In Hay, the appellant had been convicted of a felony and later pardoned by the Queen.
He then applied to the licensing justices of the Tower Division to transfer to him the license of
a fully-licensed public-house. They refused on the ground that, having been convicted of a
felony, he was ineligible to receive such license by virtue of a statute, 33 & 34 Vict. ch. 29, § 14,
which provided: "Every person convicted of felony shall for ever be disqualified from selling
spirits by retail, and no licence to sell spirits by retail shall be granted to any person who shall
have been so convicted as aforesaid." He appealed to quarter sessions against the refusal, and
the court decided in favor of the appellant, finding that the effect of the free pardon was to
remove the disqualification imposed by section 14 of the statute.
On appeal, the Queen's Bench Division affirmed the lower court's decision, describing in
broad terms the scope of the monarch's pardoning power:
By the prerogative of the Crown the pardon extends far beyond the mere discharge of
the prisoner from any further imprisonment. It is a purging of the offence. The
King's pardon, says Hale, "takes away poenam et culpam": 2 P.C. 278. This points
to the character, condition, and status of the convict. Again, in 2 Hawkins' P.C., s.
48, the author says that pardon "does so far clear the party from the infamy and all
other consequences of his crime, that he may not only have an action for a scandal in
calling him traitor or felon after the time of the pardon, but may also be a good
witness .. " So in another text-book of authority, 1 Chitty's Criminal Law, 775, it
is said that "the effect of a pardon like that of the allowance of clergy, is not merely
to prevent the infliction of the punishment denounced by the sentence, but to give to
the defendant a new capacity, credit, and character." Nothing could be more clear.
These are only text-books; but let us turn to the authority of Cuddington v. Wilkins
[(1615) Hob. 67, 81], where the plaintiff pleaded a general pardon, and on demurrer
it was "adjudged for the plaintiff, for the whole Court were of opinion, that though
he were a thief once, yet when the pardon came, it took away not only poenam, but
reatum, for felony is contra Coronam et dignitatem Regis," and it goes on to say that
"when the King has discharged it and pardoned him of it he hath cleared the person
of the crime and infamy ..
24 Q.B.D. at 564-65.
A recent opinion shows considerable erosion of this traditional view of the power of the
royal pardon in England. In Regina v. Foster, [1985] 1 Q.B. 115 (C.A. 1984), the appellant
had been granted a free pardon in respect of a rape that, it was discovered, he had in fact not
committed. On appeal against the conviction, the Court of Appeal held that the effect of a free
pardon was to remove from the subject of the pardon the penalties and punishments ensuing
from a conviction, but it did not eliminate the conviction itself. The court observed: "[Ilt is
beyond doubt, so we think, that the effect of a free pardon upon the continuing existence of a
conviction has not been considered by the courts for many years." Id. at 126. After reviewing
the relevant decisions, both in England and throughout the Commonwealth, the court
concluded:
[Counsel] has reminded us that constitutionally the Crown no longer has a preroga-
tive of justice, but only a prerogative of mercy. It cannot, therefore, he submits,
remove a conviction but only pardon its effects. The Court of Appeal (Criminal
Division) is the only body which has statutory power to quash a conviction. With
that we entirely agree.
Id. at 130 (emphasis added). Thus, while not addressing the question of the validity of a pre-
conviction pardon, the statement by the Court of Appeals in Foster does indicate a recognition
of the erosion of the royal prerogative with respect to the power of pardon generally, a fact
that undermines the assertion of Chief Justice Shamgar that the monarch's pardoning power
has not diminished. See infra text accompanying note 155.
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disputed. 54 Chief Justice Shamgar acknowledged that the pre-con-
viction pardon has fallen into disuse in England, but asserted that the
power had not thereby disappeared, and could be revived "in special
circumstances."' 55 Yet it must be acknowledged that if the power has
fallen into disuse, this must be by design, and it would be preferable
not to rely on its hypothetical continued existence for purposes of
comparison.
The Court's comparison with the American President's pardon-
ing power is similarly misplaced. The President of the United States
holds "[t]he executive power"'15 6 and is "Commander-in-chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States.'1 57 It is true that the United
States Supreme Court has continually asserted that the President's
pardoning power is absolute, "except in cases of impeachment," as
stated in the Constitution. 158 The classic statement of the Court is in
Ex parte Garland:159
The power thus conferred is unlimited, with the exception stated.
It extends to every offence known to the law, and may be exercised
at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are
taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judg-
ment.... The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in him cannot
be fettered by any legislative restrictions.
While the American President's pardoning power is absolute,
such a broad power comports with his overall power. But the com-
parison for purposes of determining the scope of the Israeli Presi-
dent's power is not instructive.
The American President's pardoning power was modeled after
the English system and was created at a time when the King's power
was still absolute. Well into the nineteenth century, the Supreme
Court asserted that it would look to English law to discover the scope
of the President's pardoning power.160 It is doubtful whether such an
154. See S.A. DE SMITH, supra note 153, at 116; H.W.R. WADE, supra note 148, at 213;
A.T.H. Smith, supra note 151, at 416-17.
155. Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D. at 540. See A.T.H. Smith, supra note 151, at 416-17.
156. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
157. Id. § 2.
158. Id.
159. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866).
160. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833) (Marshall, C.J.):
The Constitution gives to the President, in general terms, "the power to grant
reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States."
As this power had been exercised from time immemorial by the executive of that
nation whose language is our language, and to whose judicial institutions ours bear a
close resemblance; we adopt their principles regulating the operation and effect of a
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approach is still tenable today.
The American President's pardoning power has been criticized
as a constitutional aberration, given that it is unchecked and grants to
the President absolute discretion. 61 The possibility for abuse was
clearly seen in the case of President Ford's pardon of Richard M.
Nixon in 1974.162 Still, as Justice Barak notes in his dissent, since the
American President today, like the English King in the past, is re-
sponsible for executing the law, "there is a certain logic in granting
him the authority not to execute it, by virtue of a pardon, in certain
cases."1 63
In sum, the American President's pardoning power, given his
constitutional position and concomitant powers, is an inappropriate
model for determining the scope of the Israeli President's pardoning
powers.
D. "Constitutional" Interpretation
There is general agreement that the Basic Laws are constitutional
in nature, even in the absence of a formal, written constitution. 164
The three justices in the Shin Beth Case did not agree, however, on
the significance this had when it came to interpreting Basic Law:
President. Chief Justice Shamgar, relying on earlier statements by
Justice Agranat, found that the law's constitutional quality required
that it be given a "spacious view," and that this meant that the power
was broad. 165
Justice Agranat's reference had been to Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,166 in
pardon, and look into their books for rules prescribing the manner in which it is to be
used by the person who would avail himself of it.
161. See, e.g., Duker, The President's Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 475 (1977).
162. See id. at 530-35.
163. Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D. at 599 (Barak, J., dissenting). Justice Barak is not alone
in dissenting from the conclusions that have been drawn from the comparative approach. Jus-
tice Landau, dissenting in Matana, wrote: "Particularly in regard to the powers of the Presi-
dent of the State and the President of the United States, there exists in my view a fundamental
difference between the constitutional character of these institutions here and in the United
States which precludes any possibility of drawing comparisons between the two." 4 S.J. at 144
(Landau, J., dissenting). See also Matana 1, 14(11) P.D. 970, 976-77 (1960) (arguing against
reliance on comparison of Israeli President to English monarch), rev'd, 16 P.D. 430, 4 S.J. 112
(1962).
164. See supra note 85.
165. Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D. at 521.
166. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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which the United States Supreme Court was asked to determine
whether President Truman's seizure of the steel mills was within his
constitutional powers. An examination of the full context of Justice
Frankfurter's statements demonstrates that Chief Justice Shamgar,
and Justice Agranat before him, misunderstood the lesson to be
learned.
Justice Black, writing for the Court, held that President Truman
had exceeded his authority.167 Justice Frankfurter sought to describe
a proper approach to constitutional interpretation:
The pole-star for constitutional adjudication is John Marshall's
greatest judicial utterance that "it is a constitution we are ex-
pounding." McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407 [1819].
That requires both a spacious view in applying an instrument of
government "made for an undefined and expanding future,"
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 [1884], and as narrow a
delimitation of the constitutional issues as the circumstances per-
mit. Not the least characteristic of great statesmanship which the
Framers manifested was the extent to which they did not attempt
to bind the future. It is no less incumbent upon this Court to avoid
putting fetters upon the future by needless pronouncements
today. 168
When viewed in its proper context, Justice Frankfurter's teach-
ing is clear. A "spacious view" does not necessarily mean a broad
power. It means that the instrument should be viewed in its larger
context. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court held that President
Truman had exceeded his authority. A "spacious view" means that
many things may be considered, such as comparisons with other na-
tions' constitutional systems, but that the proper conclusion must be
drawn with regard to their applicability. Justice Barak emphasized
that the other governmental bodies must be considered, that this, too,
is part of a "spacious view," but that sometimes this led to an inter-
pretation of the particular power involved as narrow. The view may
be spacious, but the power in question may necessarily be restricted.
This was such a case, for interpreting the Israeli President's pardon-
ing power so as to include pre-conviction pardon caused a conflict
with the other branches of government. 
169
Moreover, Justice Frankfurter's statements regarding the narrow
167. Id. at 582-89.
168. Id. at 596 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
169. Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D. at 617-18 (Barak, J., dissenting).
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delimitation of constitutional issues, if heeded, would have prevented
Justice Agranat from ever expressing a view with regard to pre-con-
viction pardon, since that question was never in issue in either Reuven
or Matana.
E. Separation of Powers
Once it is determined that the existing case law is not dispositive
of the issue at hand, that the President of Israel is a figurehead with-
out any substantive power, that the examples of the English monarch
and the American President are inappropriate models, and that the
Basic Law need not be interpreted as granting the President broad
powers, the task is made easier. The President must find his place
among the branches of the governmental system of which he is a part;
he is to be above politics, but he is not above the law.
Justice Barak writes in dissent:
From the commission of the crime until the time of conviction in a
final judgment, different authorities operate upon the person sus-
pected of the crime: the police investigate; the prosecution prose-
cutes; the court judges; the prison system imprisons. It is not
consistent with the constitutional structure that the President's
pardoning authority be interpreted so as to give him the power to
intrude upon these other authorities' functions. It is not a desira-
ble constitutional structure that the police investigate, yet the Pres-
ident is empowered to stop the investigation; that the prosecution
prosecutes, yet the President is empowered to stop its prosecution;
that the courts judge, yet the President is empowered to interfere at
any stage of the judicial process.
170
Justice Barak thus rejected what the Court had seen to be the law
as it is. He sought to define the law as it should be:
What, then, is the desirable interpretation of the pardoning power
against the background of this constitutional structure? The desir-
able interpretation is that this power be used only after the other
governmental authorities have completed their functions. If at
such time a need arises for a pardon, the President would then be
authorized to grant it.
17 1
Such a position in fact finds support in previous statements of the
Court. In Reuven, Justice Agranat, in reviewing the use of the pardon
in England, noted that the main purpose of the pardon was to correct
170. Id. at 602 (Barak, J., dissenting).
171. Id.
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injustice in the case of an innocent person convicted by error. 172 He
stated that in Israel the primary purpose of the pardon was similarly
to correct injustice, and further that the secondary purpose was to
reduce the punishment of the offender in circumstances justifying
such action. 173 Both of these purposes clearly apply only to the post-
conviction stage.
One of the justices dissenting in Matana addressed the issue more
directly. Justice Berinson disagreed with the Court's broad interpre-
tation of the President's pardoning power as including the authority
to commute sentences, or, as he put it, "changing one punishment for
another."' 174 He felt that in so doing, the President was interfering
with the courts' work:
I agree that the institution of the Presidency stands above the vari-
ous authorities of the State in the sense that it symbolizes the State
as a whole with all its institutions and authorities, but the Presi-
dent does not stand above any institution or authority in the sense
that he may provide what it lacks or penetrate its area of activity or
interfere with its work .... The institution of pardon was not
designed to prevent, and is not capable of preventing, a generally
undesirable social phenomenon. It is the nature of pardon that it
deals with individual cases and extends kindness and mercy as a
matter of exception to [he] who is worthy of it.
17 5
In view of the purposes of pardon, too, it would be restricted to the
post-conviction stage. This approach finds support in the legal litera-
ture, 76 and serves to fit the pardon properly into the Israeli constitu-
tional structure.
F Accountability
The President of Israel is not directly accountable to anyone, and
this is yet another reason to limit his free exercise of discretion in
matters impacting so significantly on the nation's criminal justice sys-
tem and on the rule of law. The President is not elected directly by
the people, but rather by the Knesset in a secret ballot. 77 He is im-
mune from legal process "in respect of anything connected with his
172. 5 P.D. at 748-49 (Agranat, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 751.
174. 4 S.J. at 159 (Berinson, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 157-58.
176. See, e.g., Feller, Rehabilitation-A Special Legal Institution Required By Reality, I
MISHPATIM 497 (Hebrew, 1969).
177. Basic Law: President, 18 L.S.I. at 111, § 7.
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functions or powers,"'' 78 and he cannot be criminally prosecuted. 79
The Basic Law does, however, contain a mechanism designed to
provide some degree of accountability, if not oversight, but its effec-
tiveness is dubious. Section 11 of the Basic Law defines the Presi-
dent's "functions and powers." As we have seen, however, his only
real "power" is that of the pardon. 80 Section 12 provides: "The sig-
nature of the President of State on an official document, other than a
document connected with the formation of a Government, shall re-
quire the countersignature of the Prime Minister or of such other
Minister as the Government may decide."' 8' The government as-
signed to the Justice Minister the responsibility for countersigning let-
ters of pardon. 8 2
The question to be asked is whether the countersignature provi-
sion provides effective oversight. The purpose of requiring the coun-
tersignature was to provide parliamentary accountability: the minister
who countersigned the document was then answerable to the Knes-
set. 18 3 There is difference of opinion, however, as to the degree of
discretion the Justice Minister may exercise in providing his counter-
signature.' 84 The law clearly states that the President's signature
"shall require the countersignature" of the designated minister, but it
is not clear whether he must provide it. Dr. Leslie Sebba, for one, has
expressed the view that the legislature intended to create a ministerial
duty-that is, the Justice Minister must countersign the President's
pardon. Even if he disagrees with the decision, he must countersign
and defend the decision before the Knesset-or resign. In such a
178. Id. at 113, § 13(a).
179. Id. § 14.
180. See supra notes 124-34 and accompanying text.
181. 18 L.S.I. at 112, § 12.
182. H. KLINGHOFFER, supra note 125, at 519 (quoting Government directive of Apr. 17,
1948).
183. See Bracha, supra note 128, at 213-16. A similar practice has been developed in
England, where governmental ministers act in the name of the Crown but are then accountable
to Parliament for their actions. See H.W.R. WADE, supra note 148, at 49-50.
184. The various views are surveyed in A. RUBINSTEIN, supra note 126, at 395 & nn.42-
43. Justice Agranat stated in Matana that "every instrument of pardon by the President re-
quires the countersignature of the Prime Minister [or] other Minister." 4 S.J. at 136 (citing
Transition Law, 3 L.S.I. at 3, § 7). But he was merely stating the requirement of the law. The
practice is otherwise. Professor Klinghoffer expressed the view that the minister's obligation
was dependent on the President's; where the President must act, as in the ministerial duties
delineated in section 1 l(a), so, too, must the minister act, but where the President has discre-
tion, as in the case of pardon, so, too, does the minister have discretion. H. KLINGHOFFER,
HANINA B'YISRAEL (Pardon in Israel) 6 (Hebrew) (cited in A. RUBINSTEIN, supra note 126,
at 398 n.43).
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case, the Prime Minister or the succeeding Justice Minister would
countersign the pardon.18 5 Thus, according to this view, the counter-
signature requirement does not provide an effective check on the Pres-
ident's power.
The actual practice demonstrates that there is in fact no possibil-
ity for oversight. As explained by the Supreme Court in Barzilai v.
Prime Minister of Israel: 8
6
The Basic Law: President of the State requires the countersigna-
ture of one of the Ministers of the Government to the signature of
the President, and it is a constitutional custom that, in matters
concerning a pardon, the Minister of Justice presents the President
with all the requisite material to enable the latter to exercise his
powers. The Minister of Justice guarantees his countersignature to
the President in advance, by recommending to the latter that the
pardon be granted.18 7
In the case of the Shin Beth pardons, moreover, the countersignature
process, reflecting the practice referred to above, was reversed. The
Cabinet voted to recommend to the President that he grant the par-
dons. On the morning of June 25, 1986, President Herzog met with
Justice Minister Modai, who informed him of the Cabinet decision.
The Justice Minister then presented the letter of pardon, which he
had already "countersigned," to the President for his signature, which
the President provided. 8 The pardons were then effective.
The countersignature procedure is clearly not a sufficient guaran-
tee against abuse in the case where, as here, the Government itself
seeks a Presidential pardon to further its own ends. Some greater
guarantee is needed.
Both Chief Justice Shamgar and Vice-Chief Justice Ben-Porat ex-
pressed hope in their opinions that the President would exercise re-
straint and use the pardoning power sparingly, and the pre-conviction
pardon in only the rarest and most extreme circumstances. 89 To this,
Justice Barak responded:
Constitutional norms are not built on the foundation of hopes.
185. Sebba, The Pardoning Power-Prerogative of the resident of the State, 8 MISHPATIM
227, 247 (Hebrew, 1977).
186. 31(111) P.D. 671 (1977).
187. Id. at 672 (quoted in Bracha, supra note 128, at 201-02; translation of Bracha) (em-
phasis added).
188. Elon, supra note 8, at 2, col. 7.
189. Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D. at 553-54 (Shamgar, C.J.); id. at 581-83 (Ben-Porat,
V.C.J., concurring).
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Fundamental governmental principles must not be established on
the assumption that everything will operate properly. To the con-
trary, the constitutional structure is based on the assumption that
everything will not operate properly, and for this reason bounda-
ries and limits must be established. 19°
G. National Security vs. The Rule of Law
In the final analysis, the Shin Beth Affair did not turn on a legal
question of statutory interpretation. Everyone knows what an "of-
fender" is; everyone knows when the law has been broken; everyone
knows when a murder has been committed. The question is what is to
be done about it. The President felt that the requirements of national
security dictated that the Shin Beth agents who had committed mur-
der, perjury, and obstruction of justice should not stand trial. Presi-
dent Herzog stated that he had granted the pardons
with the purpose of putting an end to the devil's dance surrounding
the affair and in order to prevent additional harm to the Shin
Beth.... My decision was made with a profound awareness that
the public good and welfare of the State require that we guard our
security and protect the Shin Beth from the damage that would
result were this affair permitted to continue. 191
Chief Justice Shamgar noted that a government, in order to func-
tion properly, requires full knowledge of all that occurs within its ter-
ritory. This knowledge serves national security. "But this does not
necessarily require," he continued, "that everyone know everything.
On the contrary, there are certain circumstances and certain classes of
subjects and details, that although they are governed by law, knowl-
edge of them is restricted to a very few select individuals."'
1 92
Vice-Chief Justice Ben-Porat noted that the use of the pre-con-
viction pardon necessarily involved a conflict of interests, and thus a
proper balancing was necessary to determine which should prevail.
In this case, the principle of equality before the law was set against
national security concerns. President Herzog had determined, she
wrote, that the security concerns outweighed the interest in applying
the law equally (by prosecuting all the parties who had committed
190. Id. at 606 (Barak, J., dissenting).
191. Statement of President Herzog, June 25, 1986, quoted in Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D.
at 517-18.
192. Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D. at 555.
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crimes), and his decision was to be honored. 193
In the final analysis, the Shin Beth Affair was about the conflict
between the rule of law and the supposed needs of national security.
The majority saw in this conflict a need to decide in favor of one over
the other: the President made his decision in favor of national secur-
ity, and this decision was to be honored. But it did not have to be this
way. As Justice Barak wrote in dissent, the meaning of the rule of law
is that everyone, including the various branches of the government,
must act according to the law. Acts in defiance of the law must be
met with sanctions. The executive, too, is beholden to the law. 194 He
wrote:
Security concerns do not require a different result. There is no se-
curity without law. The rule of law guarantees national security.
Security requires that we discover the proper tools to investigate.
The strength of the Security Forces is in the public's faith in them.
If security concerns take precedence, neither the public nor the
courts will be able to have faith in the Shin Beth or in the legality
of its investigations. Without public confidence, the system of gov-
ernment will not be able to function. 195
VI. POST-DECISION DEVELOPMENTS
A. Developments in the "Original" Shin Beth Affair
The Court's decision upholding the President's pardons was
handed down on August 6, 1986. The Inspector-General of the Police
had already assembled an investigatory team following the Attorney
General's order of July 15 and had said he would head the team per-
sonally. The police were waiting only for the Supreme Court's deci-
sion. 196 As a result of the decision, there would now be an
investigation.
The police announced that the special team would begin its work
the following week. 197 But sources in the Justice Ministry stated that
any investigation would be "for show only," since the other Shin Beth
agents who had been involved in the murder of the Palestinian hijack-
ers and the subsequent coverup would almost certainly receive Presi-
193. Id. at 574-75 (Ben-Porat, V.C.J., concurring).
194. Id. at 621 (Barak, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 622.
196. Shapira, Inspector General Will Personally Lead Investigation in Shin Beth Affair,
Haaretz, July 24, 1986, at 1, col. 6.
197. Shargai & Shapira, Police Investigatory Team Has Prepared a List of Subjects,
Haaretz, Aug. 7, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
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dential pardons themselves. Thus, any investigation would not lead
to indictments.198 It was also suggested that if the Shin Beth agents
had difficulty obtaining pardons, the Attorney General would exercise
his authority to stay legal proceedings against them.' 99
Three weeks after the Court's decision, President Herzog granted
pardons to seven additional Shin Beth agents who had been involved
in the murders of the Palestinian hijackers. 200 A senior legal source
stated that the police investigation would proceed more easily now
that the Shin Beth agents could give testimony to the police investiga-
tors without fear of self-incrimination. Other sources suggested that
there was no purpose in continuing an investigation when all the sus-
pects had already been pardoned. Still others expressed satisfaction
with the additional pardons, claiming that the Shin Beth agents could
now testify concerning the involvement of the political echelon in the
killings and subsequent cover-up.20' The investigation proceeded.
The head of the Shin Beth, Avraham Shalom, had agreed to re-
sign in exchange for his pardon, 20 2 but his three senior aides, legal
advisers within the security agency, sought to remain in their posi-
tions, claiming that the President's pardons had erased their guilt.
Justice Ministry lawyers did not agree with this view, and refused to
cooperate with the Shin Beth lawyers in the prosecution of suspected
terrorists, claiming that they could not trust men who had admitted
to falsifying documents and testimony as part of the plan to cover up
the Shin Beth's killing of the two captured Palestinian hijackers. 20 3
The controversy threatened to cripple the country's legal appara-
tus. Two of the three legal advisers soon agreed to resign their posts,
but the third refused, remaining in his position until November 1986.
Then he, too, resigned.
2°4
In late December 1986, the special police investigatory commis-
sion announced its findings: Yitzhak Shamir, Prime Minister at the
time of the hijacking in April 1984, and now Prime Minister once
198. Id.
199. Id. The Attorney General is granted this authority by the Criminal Procedure Law
(Consolidated Version), 36 L.S.I. at 75, § 231(a) (1982).
200. Elon & Shapira, Senior Legal Source: The Investigation Should Continue Only If the
Political Echelon Is Investigated, Haaretz, Aug. 25, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
201. Id.
202. Eldar, Avraham Shalom: Shamir Gave Me General Authorization to Kill Terrorists
Captured in Planned Attacks, Haaretz, July 1, 1986, at 1, col. 3.
203. Friedman, Israeli Lawyers in a Dispute: Ministry K Security Agency, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 30, 1986, at A4, col. 3.
204. A Victory for Natural Justice (editorial), Haaretz, Nov. 18, 1986, at 11, col. 1.
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again, was cleared of any wrongdoing. No indictments whatsoever
were recommended. The commission's findings left the impression
that Avraham Shalom, the former head of the Shin Beth, had acted
on his own initiative in ordering, and possibly participating in, the
murder of the Palestinian hijackers. 205  This, despite Mr. Shalom's
statement to President Herzog in his request for a pardon that all his
actions "were done with the approval and authorization" of those in
charge of him-namely, then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir.2
06
Shalom had also claimed that Shamir had given him general authori-
zation to kill terrorists captured during attacks. 20 7 Shamir's associ-
ates had denied these allegations.
20 8
It is unclear whether Mr. Shamir did issue such a directive. Yet
Mr. Shalom's assertion that he did served as the basis for President
Herzog's pardons.20 9 The results of the investigation were widely crit-
icized. One political journal protested:
Since the political echelon has now been "cleared," there is no one
to stand trial. The lesson: in the State of Israel it is possible to
murder prisoners, and no one has to be brought to justice for doing
it. It is possible to fabricate testimony, lie to investigators and
judges, and no one has to be brought to justice as a result.
210
Such a conclusion seems unavoidable. 211
205. Friedman, The Verdict on Shamir, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1986, at A2, col. 3.
206. Shargai, Shin Beth Head: All My Actions Were Authorized, Haaretz, July 1, 1986, at
1, col. 4.
207. Eldar, supra note 202.
208. Id.
209. See Michael, Not Innocent, Not Pure, Haaretz Weekend Supplement, Jan. 2, 1987, at
11.
210. No One Is Guilty!, HaOlam HaZeh (weekly political journal, Hebrew), Dec. 31, 1986,
at 5.
211. In late January 1987, President Herzog, while touring an Army base, responded thus
to a soldier's question regarding the pardons he had granted in the Shin Beth Affair: "The Shin
Beth must be allowed to function." He emphasized that if the subject had been brought up for
legal determination, it would have carried on for two years and everyone would have brought
up incidents from the past. President Herzog referred to a recent incident concerning
Mordechai Vanunu, an Israeli being tried for revealing to a British newspaper classified infor-
mation regarding Israel's nuclear power plant at Dimona. Vanunu had communicated a
message concerning his capture by Israeli security agents by showing a message written on his
palm to news cameras while he was being moved from prison to court. President Herzog
stated: "In a country that is not capable of transporting a prisoner from jail to the court
without his communicating with the whole world, imagine what would happen to the Shin
Beth's secrets in the court." Podhazur, Herzog: The Shin Beth Must Be Allowed to Function;
This Year It Uncovered 310 Terrorist Rings, Haaretz (weekly ed.), Jan. 23, 1987, at Al, col. 1.
In May 1988, President Herzog was elected by the Knesset to a second five-year term of
office. See Haaretz (weekly ed.), May 12, 1988, at A7, col. 7 (photograph with caption).
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B. The "New Shin Beth Affair": The Case of Izat Nafsu
In April 1987, cryptic reports of a "new security scandal" began
to circulate. In the first news stories, it was reported that publication
of names and other details had been forbidden by the Supreme Court.
All that was reported was that "a public figure" was suspected of
fabricating evidence and obstructing justice. 212
The details were gradually made public. The case involved an
Israeli Arab Army lieutenant, Izat Nafsu, who had been convicted in
1980 of espionage and sentenced to 18 years in prison. Nafsu claimed
that he had been framed during the trial by fabricated evidence, but
he lost his appeal in the higher military court. In the summer of 1986,
the Military Justice Law was amended to permit people who lost ap-
peals in the military courts to take their cases to the civilian Supreme
Court, which Nafsu did. Nafsu claimed that Yosef Ginossar, one of
the Shin Beth legal advisers pardoned by President Herzog in the
original Shin Beth Affair, 213 was also involved in fabricating evidence
in his trial.214 The question then arose whether there should be an
investigation of the Shin Beth's procedures or whether the matter
should simply be limited to the Nafsu case. Attorney General Harish
opposed an investigation.
215
In late May 1987, the Israeli Supreme Court issued its decision in
the case.216 Chief Justice Shamgar, writing for the Court, recounted
Nafsu's claim that he had been convicted in the military courts on the
basis of a confession that was inadmissible due to impermissible physi-
cal force exerted on him by Shin Beth agents. According to Nafsu,
the force included pulling of the hair, being knocked to the ground,
kicked, slapped, and verbally abused. He was forced to remove his
clothes and stand in a cold shower. He was not allowed to sleep for
extended periods and was forced to stand for long periods in the
prison courtyard even when not being interrogated. In addition, his
212. Elon, New Security Affair Public Figure Suspected of Fabricating Evidence, Haaretz
(weekly ed.), Apr. 13, 1987, at Al, col. 1.
213. Only the name of Avraham Shalom, the head of the Shin Beth, was made public at
the time of the Shin Beth decision in 1986; the other recipients of the pardons remained anony-
mous. Mr. Ginossar's name was first made public when his picture was published in the Israeli
press in January 1987. See Haaretz, Jan. 14, 1987, at 1, col. 7.
214. Friedman, Israel Facing A New Security Scandal, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1987, at A3,
col. 1; Elon, The Prisoner Accuses Ginossar. .. , Haaretz (weekly ed.), Apr. 16, 1987, at Al, col.
5; Elon, The New Security Affair.. ., id. at A5, col. 1.
215. Elon, Jurists: Shin Beth Agents Lied at Nafsu's Trial, Haaretz (weekly ed.), Apr. 24,
1987, at Al, col. 6.
216. Nafsu v. Military Advocate General, 41(11) P.D. 631 (1987).
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interrogators threatened that his mother and wife would be
arrested.
21 7
The Court recounted the fact that when the hearing in the
Supreme Court began, the Government attorney announced that an
investigation had been conducted by the Shin Beth as well as by the
Government attorney himself, and new facts were discovered that
confirmed most of Nafsu's claims.218 In light of that fact, the prose-
cution reached an agreement with Nafsu whereby the charges of trea-
son and spying would be dropped. Nafsu would admit to the crime of
derogation from authority to the extent of endangering the security of
the State. 219 The facts stipulated to in the agreement reveal that
Nafsu did exceed his authority and violate the law by meeting with
Palestinian guerilla leaders in Southern Lebanon in 1979, although his
intention was to get information helpful to Israel. When the leader
from Al Fatah, an organization within the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization, requested information on Israeli Army operations, Nafsu
broke off contact. 220 Nafsu then failed to report these meetings to his
superiors.
2 2 1
After hearing testimony in the case, the Court accepted the ver-
sion of the facts presented in the agreement outlined above. As a re-
sult, the Court invalidated the previous convictions arrived at in the
military courts and instead convicted Nafsu, on the basis of his con-
fession, of derogation from authority in meeting with the Palestinian
guerrillas. 222 For this he was demoted to sergeant major and sen-
tenced to two years in prison. Since he had already been in prison for
seven and a half years, the Court ordered him released.
223
217. Id. at 633.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 634.
220. Id. at 634-35.
221. Id. at 635.
222. Id. at 636.
223. Id. at 637-38 (reviewing various factors as forming basis of sentence). See Friedman,
Court Finds Israel Framed a Moslem, N.Y. Times, May 26, 1987, at Al, col. 1; Elon, Nafsu
Released; Judges Harshly Criticize the Shin Beth, Haaretz (weekly ed.), May 28, 1987, at A5,
col. 1. The Court's decision was praised in the press. See Medal of Honor for the Legal System
(editorial), Haaretz (weekly ed.), May 28, 1987, at A7, col. 1; Israel Judges Itself (editorial),
N.Y. Times, May 30, 1987, at 30, col. 1.
The Court urged that the military authorities consider providing Nafsu with compensa-
tion since he had served more time in prison than the two years to which the Court had now
sentenced him. Nafsu, 41(11) P.D. at 638. Three months after the Supreme Court's decision, it
was reported that Nafsu would receive 70,000 shekels (about $47,000) from the Army as com-
pensation. The sum represented the salary he would have received during the five years and
four months he served in prison beyond the two years of the sentence that the Supreme Court
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In overturning the treason conviction, the Court severely criti-
cized the Shin Beth, both for the methods of interrogation its agents
had employed and for lying to the military tribunals in an effort to
cover up these actions. The Court called for decisive steps to be taken
"in order to root out phenomena such as this," and implored the At-
torney General to look into the matter.
224
C. The Landau Commission
In the wake of the Nafsu affair, Prime Minister Shamir requested
the establishment of a commission of inquiry to examine the conduct
of the Shin Beth, including its methods of interrogation. The Cabinet
voted on May 31, 1987 to establish the commission.225 Former
Supreme Court Chief Justice Moshe Landau was appointed its chair-
man.226 The commission was only empowered to act as a fact-finding
body with regard to the Shin Beth's practices and to frame sugges-
tions for reform .
227
The Landau Commission issued its report in late October 1987,
although only part of the report was made public. 228 A full review of
its findings is beyond the scope of this article. The following is a brief
summary of the commission's findings, as reported in the Israeli and
American press.
The Landau Commission found that over the past 16 years, since
1971, Shin Beth agents had routinely exercised excessive physical and
psychological "pressure" on suspects in order to obtain confessions,
and then lied in the military courts to cover up their actions. The
report found:
In other words, [the Shin Beth agents] simply lied, and thus com-
mitted the crime of perjury.... The giving of false testimony in
affirmed. Podhazur, Nafsu Will Receive About 70,000 Shekels Compensation for the Period of
Imprisonment, Haaretz (weekly ed.), Aug. 28, 1987, at A6, col. 8.
224. Nafsu, 41(11) P.D. at 636.
225. Shamir Asks Inquiry in Security Case, N.Y. Times, June 2, 1987, at A2, col. 1.
226. The other two members of the Commission were State Comptroller Yaakov Meltz,
and Yitzhak Hofi, former head of the Mossad intelligence service and now a general in the
Army Reserves. Elon, Landau Commission Will Convene Soon, Haaretz (weekly ed.), June 5,
1987, at Al, col. 5.
227. Professor Amnon Rubinstein criticized "(tihe establishment of a commission of in-
quiry whose whole purpose is nothing more than making suggestions in an area that is the duty
of the Government," calling it "an Israeli invention." Rubinstein, The "Judicialization" of
Israel, Haaretz (weekly ed.), June 5, 1987, at B1, col. 1.
228. The newspaper Haaretz referred to "the public portion of the report." "Three Lead-
ers of the Shin Beth Are Responsible for 16 Years of Perury," Haaretz (weekly ed.), Nov. 6,
1987, at A4, col. 1.
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the Courts quickly became a norm that no one questioned. This
norm was to remain in practice for 16 years. . . . Two serious
events that were publicized and caused an upheaval, one after the
other, the Bus 300 affair [i.e., the original Shin Beth Affair] and the
Nafsu affair, are what quickly led to the discovery of this norm as
well as its cessation.229
Despite its findings, the commission recommended that no legal
action be taken against any of the Shin Beth agents suspected of exert-
ing "pressure" on suspects during the investigations and of commit-
ting perjury during trials. This recommendation was based on the
finding that the agents had not deviated from the directives in effect at
the time of the interrogations. As for giving false testimony, the com-
mission recommended that the agents not be prosecuted because their
motivation had not been selfish, but rather they mistakenly believed
that their actions served the public. The commission expressed con-
cern that had it recommended legal action against the Shin Beth
agents, the service would be paralyzed and the public would suffer.230
Significantly, the commission explicitly condoned the use of
some force in the course of interrogation. The New York Times
reported:
The report did not condemn the use of psychological pressures and
even moderate use of force against guerrillas, saying those who try
to kill and maim women and children have forfeited the "moral
right to demand the state safeguard normally accepted civil
rights." When psychological methods fail, "mild physical pressure
should not be avoided," but Shin Beth should be humane and draw
clear guidelines to prevent excessive use of force, it said.231
The report has not gone unheeded. In early November 1987, the
Government voted to accept the Landau Commission's findings and
to appoint a committee of Government ministers to oversee the Shin
Beth. 232 Whether such oversight will be effective remains to be seen.
229. Id.
230. Id. See also Israel Inquiry Says Security Agents Lied at Trials of Terrorist Suspects,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1987, at 1, col. 4.
231. Id.
232. The committee was to consist of Prime Minister Shamir as Chairman, as well as
Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and the Justice Minister.
Eldar, Ministerial Committee Led by Shamir Will Supervise Implementation of Landau Re-
port's Recommendations, Haaretz (weekly ed.), Nov. 13, 1987, at A5, col. 5.
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
Criticizing the Supreme Court's reasoning in upholding the Pres-
ident's pardons may shed light on the issue, but it is not sufficient. It
is now settled law: the President may pardon prior to conviction.
Both Chief Justice Shamgar and Vice-Chief Justice Ben-Porat sug-
gested that reform might be due, but said that any change in what
they saw as the existing legal situation should be accomplished by
legislation.233 Chief Justice Shamgar specifically recommended that
the pardoning process be depoliticized. 234 Although the requirement
of the countersignature was intended to prevent the arbitrary use of
the pardoning power, this device, as we have seen, is not effective in
its present form. 235 A new arrangement is required.
The pardoning power could be eliminated totally, but such a step
does not seem desirable. The institution, though a remnant of abso-
lute monarchy, has been retained by most of the countries of the
world. 236 While the possibility of injustice through error is today
largely addressed in Israel by the provision for retrial, 237 no system is
immune to failure. Thus, the traditional reason for the power
remains.
It has been suggested in the American context that the pardoning
power could be concentrated in another authority-for example, the
legislature or judiciary-but this same analysis rejected such a change
for the reason that the pardon is needed precisely to provide a check
on the legislature and judiciary. If the legislature passes laws that are
too harsh, the pardon can be used to suggest reform; if the judiciary
errs, the pardon can be used to avoid injustice.238
This same analysis concluded with the suggestion that in the
United States the pardoning power be left to the President, but that
Congress be provided with a veto power. The President's pardon
would be effective unless and until Congress voted within 180 days by
a two-thirds majority to disapprove the pardon.239 But such an ar-
233. Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D. at 534 (Shamgar, C.J.); id. at 583 (Ben-Porat, V.C.J.,
concurring).
234. Id. at 563.
235. See supra notes 181-88 and accompanying text.
236. See Sebba, The Pardoning Power-A World Survey, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
83 (1977).
237. Courts Law, 11 L.S.I. at 159, § 9 (1957).
238. Duker, The President's Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 475, 536-37 (1977).
239. Id. at 537. The arrangement is that of an amendment proposed by Senator Mondale
in the 93d Congress. S.J. Res. 240, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
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rangement, though perhaps workable in the United States, would be
untenable in Israel. Given the Israeli President's honorary position
and the great esteem in which the office has traditionally been held,
the Knesset would surely be reluctant to disapprove of the President's
action by an open vote. The President is, after all, supposed to be
above politics.
The recommendation of the noted scholar S.Z. Feller 24° deserves
serious consideration. He accepts the need for the institution of par-
don but advocates a change in the way it may be exercised. In his
view, pardon should operate on the punishment only, and as such be
seen as an act of mercy. It could thus be used only after conviction.
It would not serve to erase guilt, for this would undermine the deter-
rent effect of a final judicial determination, as well as judicial author-
ity.241 In the case where there is error in the conviction, the
institution of retrial can be employed. 242 Thus may an unjust convic-
tion be obliterated. Acquittal is a declaration that there is no guilt;
there should not be resort to the legal fiction of using a pardon to
acknowledge that a crime has been committed and at the same time to
say that it has not been committed. 243 In the case of the Shin Beth
Affair, as we have seen, the pardoned legal advisers attempted to re-
tain their positions, claiming that their guilt had been erased, but their
acts had not disappeared from memory.
244
Professor Feller recommended the following change in the Basic
Law, a change that seems especially wise in the wake of the Shin Beth
Affair. Section 1 (b) would be amended as follows:
(b) The President of the State shall have the power to remit pun-
ishments. The remission may be full or partial, or may commute
the sentence to one less severe.
(c) The remission shall be individual, and even if it is full it shall
not serve to erase the conviction. 245
240. Feller, Rehabilitation-A Special Legal Institution Required by Reality, 1 MISHPATIM
497 (Hebrew, 1969).
241. Id. at 503.
242. Id. Retrial is provided for in the Courts Law, 11 L.S.I. at 159, § 9.
243. See Feller, supra note 240, at 506.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 202-04.
245. Feller, supra note 240, at 518 (proposed amendment No. 3). Professor Feller used the
word limhol (root m-h-1), which is variously translated as to pardon, forgive, forgo, renounce,
yield, remit. Given the legal meaning of the English term "pardon," however, it is clear that
"pardon" would not be an appropriate translation. Feller studiously avoided the Hebrew
word lahon, which currently appears in Basic Law: President and which means "to pardon,"
laden as it is with a sense of absolute authority. See supra note 122.
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Adoption of Professor Feller's proposal, or some version thereof,
would be a wise step for a number of reasons. It would avoid the
separation of powers problem inherent in the use of the pre-conviction
pardon. The police investigate and the courts judge, and it is not de-
sirable that the President of Israel, who does not possess any machin-
ery to perform his own investigation, be permitted to interfere with
the functioning of the criminal justice system. The proposal would
also depoliticize the pardon, since by its being restricted to the post-
conviction stage, it could not be used to shield individuals from the
law in the supposed interest of national security. Any injustice that
occurs in a trial may be addressed by a retrial. The President's power
would be restricted to an act of mercy in the most extraordinary cir-
cumstances, but he would not be able to erase guilt. This is appropri-
ate for a functionary who is not, as the King of England was
traditionally viewed, the "fountain of justice. ' '
24
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Israeli President's pardoning power in its present form is too
easily given to abuse, as the Shin Beth Affair clearly demonstrates.
This was not the first time that a controversial pardon has been
granted,247 though it may well have been the most controversial. The
President of Israel is said to symbolize the State and be above politics.
The pardoning power in its present form seriously threatens to under-
mine this status. By descending to the battlefield of the Shin Beth
controversy, the President politicized the office and damaged its
integrity.
The Shin Beth Case was, in the end, a confrontation between the
asserted requirements of national security on the one hand and the
rule of law on the other. In this case, the President, in the name of
national security, subverted the rule of law. He said to the nation that
agents of the security forces are above the law. The Supreme Court in
turn, by upholding the President's pardons, said to the nation that the
President is above the law.
Attorney General Harish, in arguing before the Court that the
President should not be called to answer the claims against his ac-
tions, stated: "The President must remain a symbol, saved from ha-
tred and evil attacks.... A king does not judge, and he is not judged.
246. S.A. DE SMITH, supra note 153, at 128.
247. See Bracha, supra note 128, at 223-24 n.144-45 (citing examples of other controver-
sial uses of the Presidential pardon).
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We have no king. We have only a President. He... symbolizes the
State.,
248
It was thus perhaps in response to Attorney General Harish's
statement that Justice Barak chose to conclude his dissent as he did:
It is told that there once was an argument between King
James I and Lord Coke. The question was whether the King was
authorized to take matters belonging to the judiciary into his hands
and decide them on his own. Lord Coke tried to convince the
King that judgment required expertise that the King did not pos-
sess. The King was not convinced. Thereupon, Lord Coke rose
and said:
"'Quod rex non debet sub homine, sed sub deo et
lege. "
"The King ought not to be subject to man, but subject
to God and to the law."
So be it.249
248. Shargai, Shin Beth Head: All My Actions Were Authorized, Haaretz, July 1, 1986, at
1, col. 4.
249. Shin Beth Case, 40(111) P.D. at 623 (Barak, J., dissenting).
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